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Federal law has prohibited racial segregation in government-housing
programs for decades, yet it has proven difficult to reverse entrenched patterns
of segregation in these programs.2 Patterns of racial segregation have been
particularly intractable in New Orleans, which, prior to Hurricane Katrina in
2005, boasted the second-highest level of poverty concentration in the nation3
and relatively high levels of poverty concentration in all of the major
government-housing programs. 4 Furthermore, low-income white residents in
pre-Katrina New Orleans had greater access to middle-income neighborhoods
throughout the metropolitan area of New Orleans than low-income black5
residents, who were overwhelmingly concentrated into high-poverty
to tools of
neighborhoods.6 As a result, low-income white residents had access
upward economic mobility not available to urban black residents.7
Hurricane Katrina, with its massive levee failures and neighborhood
flooding, offered an opportunity for New Orleans to emerge as a more
inclusive region; new government-assisted housing could have helped facilitate

1. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based
on race and other grounds in housing); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006) ("All citizens of the
United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.");
Clients' Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1408 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that HUD's actions were
unconstitutional because HUD continued to fund racial discrimination and segregation in its
housing programs); infra note 15.
2. See Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1045-47 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (describing the
historical ineffectiveness of HUD's efforts to desegregate housing), vacated, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th
Cir. 1987).
3. See ALAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, KATRINA'S WINDOW: CONFRONTING
CONCENTRATED POVERTY ACROSS AMERICA 3 & tbl.1 (Brookings Institution 2005),

available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2005/10poverty berube/200510
12_Concentratedpoverty.pdf.
4. See id. at 5 (listing the average neighborhood-poverty rate for public-housing residents
in New Orleans at 74% in 2000); infra Part III.A-D.
5. In this Article, the terms "black" and "white" are used, rather than "African American"
and "white," for the sake of parallelism.
6.
7.

See infra Part III.E.
See infra Part III.E.
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inclusion, while also responding to the regional-housing needs of the area.
However, as Orleans Parish attempted after the storm to reverse a dynamic in
which a disproportionate number of its occupants were renters, compared with
the metro area as a whole, neighboring jurisdictions acted aggressively to
avoid any demographic shifts that new rental housing, particularly new
government-assisted rental housing, might bring.9 Rental bans proliferated
throughout the region, primarily in communities that had previously served as
affordable suburban alternatives for lower- and middle-income whites in prior
decades.' 0 These communities sought not only to prevent the development of
new rental housing, but also to limit the repair of rental housing that preexisted
the storm.11 At the same time, other communities in metropolitan New
Orleans that were the least affordable, most homogeneous, and nationally
recognized as desirable places to live were not targeted for
government-assisted housing, and thus did not pass similar sweeping rental
bans.12 Therefore, rather than using recovery efforts to reverse racially
segregated housing patterns, the region took steps to exacerbate them.
This Article contends that post-Katrina New Orleans exemplifies the
exclusionary dynamic in which government-assisted housing operates
throughout America and the fundamental failure of American housing policy at
the federal, state, and local levels to prevent the racial segregation that
inevitably results. Part I discusses the well-established legal framework
prohibiting racial segregation in government-assisted housing. Part II explains
that, despite established law, it has proven extremely difficult to reverse
entrenched patterns of racial segregation in government-housing programs. In
fact, recent studies have found that low-income blacks using government
housing programs live in worse or more segregated housing conditions when
compared with either whites who are using the programs or blacks who are not
using the programs. This Part also describes a perennial dynamic of two
impulses pulling in opposite directions-the anywhere-ist and nowhere-ist
impulses, which conspire to perpetuate segregation. The anywhere-ists are
primarily focused on securing as much federally assisted housing as possible;
the nowhere-ists are primarily focused on keeping it out of their communities.
This dynamic has created a "path of least resistance," whereby
government-assisted housing continues to be provided in places where it
already exists or in places that are already open and affordable. Part III
describes the way in which racial segregation and poverty concentration were
particularly exaggerated pre-Katrina across all the government-housing
programs in metropolitan New Orleans, as compared to levels documented in
8. See BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the opportunity the rebuilding effort
would provide the government to combat segregation).
9. See infra Part V.B.
10. See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying note 187.
12. See infra notes 320-22 and accompanying text.
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the top fifty metropolitan areas in the United States. In addition, low-income
whites had disproportionately greater access to middle-income neighborhoods
when compared with low-income blacks. Part IV discusses the opportunity
presented by the post-Katrina rebuilding effort to reverse entrenched patterns
of racial segregation in government housing.
Part V describes that, regardless of the opportunity, the region seems poised
to recreate segregated-housing patterns. This Part discusses examples of the
anywhere-ist and nowhere-ist impulses at work in post-Katrina New Orleans,
noting the rental-affordability crisis and the exclusionary-zoning activity
emerging in towns, cities, and parishes surrounding New Orleans. It describes
in detail the restrictions on rental housing enacted in the affordable suburbs of
Terrytown, Kenner, and Saint Bernard Parish, as compared with the absence of
sweeping restrictions in more expensive suburbs such as Metairie and
Mandeville.
In Part VI, the Article recommends several fair-housing reforms in response
to the post-Katrina experience, including rejection of the "path of least
resistance" approach to the location of government housing, distribution, and
management of government-assisted housing on a regional basis, and a more
targeted intervention in the housing market by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) to ensure that government-assisted housing is
actually provided in markets that are not already open and affordable.
I. THE WELL-ESTABLISHED PROHIBITION ON RACIAL SEGREGATION IN
GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED HOUSING PROGRAMS
The idea that public housing in the United States was created pursuant to a
policy of de jure racial segregation is not particularly controversial.13 In fact,
government agencies, both federal and local, were leaders in formalizing
racially segregated housing patterns throughout the nation.14 In New Orleans,
"the creation of racially segregated New Deal public housing developments
was the first implementation of legally enforced residential segregation in the
city."' 5
challenge
began
to
communities
rights era,
In the
civil
government-sponsored segregation in government-assisted housing. As early
as 1969, courts pronounced it unconstitutional to select sites for government13. Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (E.D. Tex. 1985) ("Prior to 1964, public
housing was dejure segregated."),vacated, 822 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1987).
14. See, e.g., id at 1044-50 (detailing HUD's and local agencies' contributions to
segregated housing in east Texas).
15. Elizabeth Fussell, ConstructingNew Orleans, ConstructingRace: A Population History
of New Orleans, 94 J. AM. HIST. 846, 581 (2007); see also Martha Mahoney, Law and Racial
Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1270

(1990) (describing how segregated public-housing projects in New Orleans, although an
improvement over decaying private housing, disrupted racially mixed residential patterns and
increased racial concentration within the city).
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assisted housing developments on the basis of race.16 Similarly, in the late
1960s, HUD began to issue rules and regulations prohibiting the concentration
of new government-assisted housing exclusively in black neighborhoods. 17 As
observed by one commentator, the idea that HUD "should no longer be
permitted to routinely build new low-income housing in segregated,
high-poverty neighborhoods" is a point civil rights advocates "won" decades
ago. Nor can housing agencies reserve units developed in white areas for
white occupants.19 Despite the historical refusal of some local agencies "to
accept the premise that federal law applied" to them,20 the federal prohibition
against segregation and discrimination in both public and private housing
21
programs is well established.
The Gautreaux line of cases represents the prototypical challenge to
government-sponsored segregation.22
In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
16. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth. (Gautreaux1), 296 F. Supp. 907, 913 (N.D. Ill.
1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970). The plaintiffs in Gautreaux also alleged that tenant
assignment was conducted on a racially discriminatory basis. Id at 908. Even before 1969,
courts held that the maintenance of segregation in public housing through the assignment of
tenants on the basis of race violated the Constitution and the Civil Rights statutes. See, e.g., Vann
v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 113 F. Supp. 210, 212 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (citing Seawell v.
MacWithey, 63 A.2d 542, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949)) (noting that public-housing
projects cannot segregate based on race because of the Privileges and Immunities and Due
Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution and because of language in the statute that authorized
the public housing); see also Young, 628 F. Supp. at 1045 (discussing the 1962 passage of
President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order Number 11063 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, each requiring a policy of nondiscrimination in federally assisted housing).
17. See Young, 628 F. Supp. at 1045-47 (discussing HUD's site selection and marketing
rules and regulations issued in 1967, 1972, and 1977 pertaining to a variety of federally assisted
housing programs). Despite these regulations, however, HUD's actions continued to create
segregated housing. Id. at 1048 (discussing the failure to market units built in white
neighborhoods to black individuals).
18.

Philip D. Tegeler, The Persistence of Segregation in Government Housing Programs,in

THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUstNG CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA

197, 197 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).
19. See Clients' Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1415, 1419 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that,
during a compliance review, HUD found the housing authority's policies discriminatory because
the housing authority intended to assign white occupants to new projects in a "traditionally White
neighborhood" and because the housing authority instructed employees "'to rent to whites in the
white area and to Blacks in the black area').
20. Id. at 1415.
21. Young, 628 F. Supp. at 1045-47. Of course, HUD policies in the post-civil rights era,
designed to prohibit discriminatory site selection of new housing developments, as well as the
assignment of tenants on a discriminatory basis, were largely prospective in nature and
"ineffective in remedying past segregation or preventing segregated occupancy in new project
sites." Id. at 1046.
22. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), aff'g 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974);
Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970) (GautreauxII), aff'g 296 F. Supp.
907 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Hills and Gautreaux I are the culmination of two separate lines of cases
involving the same plaintiffs. In Gautreaux II, the plaintiffs brought suit against the Chicago
Housing Authority, 436 F.2d at 307; in Hills, the same plaintiffs brought suit against HUD for the
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Authority, black tenants in and applicants for public housing in Chicago
alleged that the Chicago Housing Authority "intentionally chose sites for
family public housing and adopted tenant assignment procedures . .. for the
purpose of maintaining existing patterns of residential separation of races in
the City of Chicago," and that the Chicago Housing Authority "fail[ed] to
select sites for public housing in a manner which would alleviate existing
patterns of racial separation."
At the time, the membership of the housing
authority's public-housing waiting list was 90% black.
The housing
authority used a preclearance procedure, allowing elected officials to exercise a
"racial veto" over public housing sites selected in white neighborhoods in their
districts. 25 In 1969, the district court found the local defendants liable under
the Constitution and federal statutes, holding that "[n]o criterion, other than
race, can plausibly explain the veto of over [99.5%] of the housing units
located on the White sites" when only 10% of those sites in black
Later, in the companion case to this
neighborhoods were vetoed.
district-court decision, the Seventh Circuit held that HUD had also violated the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VI) by knowingly providing financial assistance to the segregated
housing program, among other things. 27
Courts throughout the country have reached similar holdings in the face of
evidence of racially motivated decision-making in the selection of sites for
government-assisted housing.28 Courts have also considered statistics that
same allegedly discriminatory housing policies. 425 U.S. at 286. For a comprehensive history of
the Gautreaux litigation, see Alexander Polikoff, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF
SEGREGATION, HOUsING, AND THE BLACK GHETTO (2006).
23.

Gautreaux H1,436 F.2d at 307; see also Gautreaux I, 296 F. Supp. 907, 910 (N.D. Ill.

1969) (noting that, given population trends at the time, "[99.5%] of [Chicago Housing Authority]
family units are located in areas which are or soon will be substantially all Negro").
24. Gautreaux 1, 296 F. Supp. at 909.
25. Id at 910. State law required City Council approval of all Chicago Housing Authority
(CHA) sites; however, rather than formally submit the sites to the Council, CHA conceded that it
informally precleared the sites, resulting in the veto of virtually all sites in white neighborhoods.
Id The housing authority initially identified forty-one sites in white neighborhoods, which could
have yielded 7883 desegregative housing options for its 90% black waiting list. Id at 909-11.
However, it chose only two sites in white neighborhoods during the relevant period: one site
bordering a predominantly black neighborhood and another yielding only thirty-six units. Id. In
the opinion of CHA's General Counsel, "land in White areas equally suitable for development
and often cheaper than land in Negro areas was unavailable solely because of the requirement of
City Council approval." Id at 913.
26. Id at 912. The district court found that based on numerous uncontroverted statements
made by housing-authority officials, there was no genuine issue of fact that the veto of a
substantial number of public-housing sites was made on racial grounds. Id. at 913.
27. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 425 U.S. 284
(1976).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1226 (2d. Cir. 1987)
(upholding the district court's finding "that racial animus was a significant factor motivating
those white residents who opposed the location of low-income housing in their predominantly
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demonstrate the overwhelming segregation in public-housing sites, finding "a
very high probability, a near certainty, that many sites were vetoed on the basis
of the racial composition of the site's neighborhood." 29 Courts have
consistently struck down such practices, stating that "this nation is committed
to a policy of balanced and dispersed public housing."30
As illustrated in the Gautreaux cases, HUD, as the principal federal agency
providing financial backing to local housing authorities, municipal
governments, and private-property owners, need not be the central architect of
discrimination to be held accountable.31 Courts have held HUD liable when it
did nothing to change a grantee's operation in the face of "blatant segregation
and an admitted determination to intentionally discriminate." 32 Though
HUD's awareness of discriminatory practices is important in establishing its
liability for the discrimination and segregation in public housing, courts have
rejected HUD's claims of ignorance of widespread segregation in the programs

white neighborhoods," and holding the City liable for segregated public housing because the City
"cater[ed] to this 'will of the people'); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 389-90 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (finding that Fulton County officials had deliberately obstructed, on the basis of race,
attempts to place low-income public housing in unincorporated areas of the county inhabited
principally by whites); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669,
674-75, 693-95 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that the city's planning and zoning boards and city
council violated the Equal Protection Clause and Fair Housing Act because they confined 98.9%
of the nonwhite population to an area separated from the rest of the city by railroad tracks that
was heavily polluted by an adjacent steel mill and that contained aging, dilapidated housing),
aff d, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. La. 1969)
(holding that HUD and the Bogalusa Housing Authority engaged in "rank discrimination" by
"selecting sites for the location of public housing [based on] the racial concentration of the
neighborhoods," when the purpose of such site selection "was to perpetuate segregation of the
races in public housing"); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266, 268-69 (W.D. Okla. 1969)
(holding that the city's denial of a rezoning request was racially motivated and unconstitutional
because the city sought to prevent the building of low-income housing in an area predominately
occupied by whites), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
29. Gautreaux1, 296 F. Supp. at 913.
30. Crow, 332 F. Supp. at 390; see also Hicks, 302 F. Supp. at 622 ("In a series of
interpretations, and with increasing clarity and vigor, HUD has indicated that Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 forbids the construction of federally financed public housing in all-Negro
neighborhoods in the absence of a clear showing that no other acceptable sites are available.").
31. Gautreaux, 448 F.2d at 739.
32. Clients' Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1422-23 (8th Cir. 1983) (explaining that
HUD provided over $1,475,528 in funds to the Texarkana Housing Authority (THA) despite
HUD's findings of THA noncompliance with civil rights laws); see also Garrett v. City of
Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1247 (6th Cir. 1974) ("By failing to halt a city program [after it
knew] discrimination in housing was being practiced and encouraged, HUD perpetuated
segregation in public housing and participated in denial to the plaintiffs of their constitutional
rights."); Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1056 (E.D. Tex. 1985), vacated, 822 F.2d 1368
(5th Cir. 1987) ("HUD's intent to discriminate is established by the combination of HUD's
disingenuous assertions of ignorance, its actual knowledge of segregation, and its continuing
financial support of each public housing site in the [36 East Texas] counties.").

Catholic UniversityLaw Review

668

[Vol. 60:661

it funds. 33 As then-Chief Judge William Wayne Justice stated in Young v.
Pierce, "HUD does have a duty to know if it is funding discrimination." 34
It is also not necessary for a government a ency to act with actual malice to
be accountable for perpetuating segregation. 5 A HUD decision to continue
funding programs and entities that perpetuate segregation-whether through
site selection or tenant assignment-is likely not accompanied by an intention
to humiliate or cause others to suffer.36 It is more likely that these decisions
result from a capitulation to the idea that segregation is inevitable and,
therefore, acceptable. And yet, courts have inferred discriminatory purpose
in such instances: 38 "It is inconceivable that HUD would have so frequently
acted to approve the [local housing authority's] actions for so long unless its
officials held the view that segregation and discrimination were acceptable."3 9
HUD's obligations extend beyond the prohibition on discrimination and also
encompass an affirmative duty to further fair housing in the programs it funds.
This affirmative obligation is located in the Fair Housing Act of 1968.40 For
example, "Congress imposed on HUD a substantive obligation to promote
racial and economic integration in administering the section 8 program." 41
Further, "[als part of HUD's duty under the Fair Housing Act, an approved
housing project must not be located in an area of undue minority concentration,
which would have the effect of perpetuating racial segregation."42 Some

33. See Garrett, 503 F.2d at 1246 ("The record supports a finding that HUD must have
known of the discriminatory practices which pervaded the private housing market .... ); Young,
628 F. Supp. at 1056-57 (explaining that HUD knew of and continued to fund segregated housing
and therefore "played a crucial and continuing role in creating and maintaining a large system of
publicly funded segregated housing").
34. Young, 628 F. Supp. at 1044 n.4.
35. See Gautreaux I, 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (holding the city liable even
though the aldermen who vetoed public housing in white neighborhoods were responding to
public pressure and were not necessarily motivated by their own racial animus), aff'd, 436 F.2d
306 (7th Cir. 1970); see also Clients' Council, 711 F.2d at 1423 ("We do not suggest that HUD
officials were motivated by malice, but we do believe that this record compels a conclusion that
they acted at least in part because of a discriminatory purpose.").
36.

Clients' Council,711 F.2d at 1423.

37. See id. (rejecting HUD's argument that "its actions were an inevitable consequence of
its desire to provide low income housing").
38. See, e.g., id ("[T]he only reasonable inference that can be drawn is that HUD's actions
[of continued funding of a housing authority it cited for discrimination] were motivated at least in
part by a discriminatory purpose.").
39. Id
40. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006) ("The Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development shall . . . administer the programs and activities relating to housing and urban
development in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of this subchapter.").
41. Alschuler v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 686 F.2d 472, 482 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 1437f(a), 3608(d)(5), the latter of which was a precursor to § 3608(e)(5)).
42. Id (citing Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d. 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Shannon v. U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1970)).
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courts have interpreted HUD's affirmative obligation to extend to local
agencies that receive federal housing funds. 43
Given the longstanding precedents establishing constitutional and statutory
prohibitions against segregation in the nation's housing programs, one might
think that a nondiscriminatory and desegregative ethos would have infused the
nation's housing programs at both the federal and local levels. This, as
evidenced, is not so.
II.

THE DIFFICULTY OF REVERSING ENTRENCHED PATTERNS OF RACIAL
SEGREGATION IN THE NATION'S HOUSING PROGRAMS

Despite the well-established pronouncements against discrimination and
segregation in the nation's housing programs, reversing patterns of racial
The National
segregation in these programs has proven difficult. 44
Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity notes that "[t]he federal
government's three largest federal housing programs (Section 8, public
housing, and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit) serve more than 4.5 million
families and yet do very little to further fair housing and, in some cases, work
to create and/or maintain segregated housing patterns." 45 This persistent and
seemingly intractable segregation is demonstrated by a 2008 HUD study
entitled Characteristicsof HUD-Assisted Renters and Their Units in 2003.

The study is based on census data collected in 2003 through the American
Housing Survey (AHS) that was matched with HUD rental-assistance data.47
According to Elizabeth Julian and Michael Daniel, who have analyzed the
data, "poor [b]lack renters, as a result of accepting HUD rental assistance, will
43.

See, e.g., Otero, 484 F.2d at 1133-34.

44. See Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1043-47 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (discussing the
ongoing failure of federal-housing agencies to reverse patterns of racial segregation in the
federally assisted housing they funded following the end of de jure segregation); NAT'L COMM'N
ON FAIR Hous. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING: REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 38 (2008) [hereinafter

NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/

reports/Future of Fair Housing.PDF ("Today, for a number of reasons, federal programs are still
focusing low-income housing resources in higher poverty, segregated areas."); Florence Wagman
Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segregation in Federally

FinancedHousing, 48 How. L.J. 913, 913 (2005) (noting "pervasive racial discrimination and
segregation" in federally assisted housing programs despite legal standards aimed at prohibiting
such segregation).
45.

NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, Executive Summary.

46.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., CHARACTERISTICS OF HUD-ASSISTED

RENTERS AND THEIR UNITS IN 2003 passim (2008), available at http://www.huduser.org/portall

publications/pubasst/hud asst rent.html.
47. Id at 4-5; see also Elizabeth Julian & Michael M. Daniel, HUD-Assisted Low-Income
Housing: Is It Working and for Whom?, POVERTY & RACE, July-Aug. 2009, at 3, 3 ("The

information includes demographic data for hundreds of units, projects and neighborhood
conditions for individuals living in HUD-assisted housing and those eligible for, but not
receiving, such assistance.").
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be subjected to worse conditions or more segregated conditions, or both,
compared to similarly situated [w]hites using HUD assistance," and compared
to similarly situated poor black renters not using any HUD assistance at all.48
Thus, not only are blacks worse off than their white counterparts in
government-assisted housing programs, but poor blacks who participate in
govemment-assisted housing programs seem to be worse off than those who do
not. After pointing out the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against
providing housing on such unequal terms, Julian and Daniel note that "much of
the debate about national housing policy for the poor goes on as if these
[unequal housing] conditions did not exist, do not exist, and that the nation
does not know about it." 49
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC), which was
launched in 1986, is now the nation's largest low-income-housing production
program.5o The Department of the Treasury administers the program, as
opposed to HUD, and "state agencies . . . distribute the [tax] credit to
developers on a competitive basis."5 1 Despite its size-as of 2007 about 1.5
million units, funded52 at $5 billion per year and matched by hundreds of
millions of state, local, and private funds-the federal government has never
collected data revealing the impact of the program on racial residential
Available data suggest that "[t]ax credit units
segregation.53
are . .. more likely [than rental units generally] to be located in high-poverty
areas, and in largely minority or rental occupied tracts with large proportions
of female-headed households." 54 A recent, national study of where tax credit
units are developed reveals that "the program is not directing units where few
or no affordable housing options exist," but rather, is concentrating the units
where they are the least needed, thus contributing to poverty concentration.
48. Julian & Daniel, supra note 47, at 6-7. In segregated housing developments
historically, units that were occupied by blacks were frequently inferior, suffering from a lack of
maintenance or inferior construction methods. See Clients' Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406,
1419 (8th Cir. 1983) ("HUD found that black projects suffered from neglect 'in spite of constant
and numerous complaints resulting from faulty original construction' . . .
49. Julian & Daniel, supra note 47, at 7.
50. Tegeler, supra note 18, at 201. "The Low Income Housing Tax Credit provides
investors in rental housing developments a credit against their federal income tax obligations.
State agencies receive an allocation of tax credit each year from the U.S. Treasury, which they in
turn allocate to developers of rental housing ..... JILL KHADDURI ET AL., LIHTC AND MIXED
INCOME HOUSING: ENABLING FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN TO LIVE IN Low POVERTY

NEIGHBORHOODS? 2 (2004). These developers must reserve a percentage of units for households
with incomes ranging from 30-60% of the area's median income. Id
51. Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair
Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1749-50 (2005).
52. See Kirk McClure, Are Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Developments Locating Where
There Is a Shortage ofAffordable Units?, 20 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 153, 153 (2010).

53.

Orfield, supra note 51, at 1779-80.

54.

See id at 1781.

55.

McClure, supra note 52, at 169.
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There are multiple possible explanations for the persistence of segregation in
the nation's housing programs. First, court pronouncements of liability for
government-sponsored segregation are inadequate by themselves and must be
accompanied by strong remedies, which then must be enforced through
ongoing, sometimes decades-long, litigation. 5 6 Second, according to some
commentators, HUD's regulations prohibiting the location of new public
housing and Section 8 housing in an "area of minority concentration"57 are
riddled with "ambiguity," resulting in "substantial litigation and weakening of
the standards over time to the point where they hare] no longer effective in
Third, as noted by
controlling segregated housing development."
commentators including Florence Roisman and Phil Tegeler, programs
creating significant amounts of housing, such as the LIHTC program, have
been "largely unregulated from a civil rights perspective." 59
Beyond the regulatory shortcomings, however, another, more insidious
dynamic is at work. There are two impulses pulling in opposite directions that
operate in tandem to perpetuate concentrated poverty and segregation. One
impulse is to take any affordable housing that can be acquired and use it to
meet critical housing shortages, an approach that might be described as "get

56. See, e.g., Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 404 F.3d 821, 824 (4th Cir.
2005) (affirming the district court's modification of a consent decree to extend the district court's
jurisdiction over HUD for more than the originally ordered seven years); see also Orfield, supra
note 5 1,at 1804 (referring to the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 and noting the need for
"persistent advocacy" to achieve the Act's goals).
57. 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(i) (2010). In addition, this regulation prohibits sites that
would increase poverty concentration by requiring that the site must "avoid undue concentration
of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons."
Id. §941.202(d).
58. Tegeler, supra note 18, at 200 (citing Michael J. Vernarelli, Where Should HUD Locate
Assisted Housing? in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 214 (John Goering ed.

1986)).
59. Id. at 197-98 (discussing, in addition to the LIHTC program, the lack of
anti-segregation controls in the HOPE VI public-housing redevelopment program, low-income
housing financed through incentives in the Community Reinvestment Act, and the Housing
Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) program for housing rehabilitation); Florence Wagman
Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program and the Civil

Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1998) ("Despite massive governmental
involvement, the LIHTC program operates without effective regard to civil rights laws, due
primarily to the fact that the Treasury and state and local agencies have failed to impose
meaningful bars to discrimination."). Recent case law suggests that tax-credit agencies ignore
civil rights laws at their own risk. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Hous. &
Cmty. Affairs, No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2010 WL 3766714, at *9, *13 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010)
(granting partial summary judgment to a nonprofit alleging that the Texas
tax-credit agency's decision to disproportionately approve applications for non-elderly tax-credit
units in minority neighborhoods constituted a disparate impact as well as intentional
discrimination, and holding that prima facie cases were established under the Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution).
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the housing now." 60 The other impulse is to block affordable housing in all
forms.61 The resulting conflict between those who would accept affordable
housing anywhere, in any configuration, and on any terms, and those who
would not accept it in any configuration anywhere near them, fuels the worst
fears of each camp.
The anywhere-ists most fear the success of the nowhere-ists in abolishing a
federal role in providing low-income housing.62 Thus, the first priority for the
anywhere-ists is to secure as much government-assisted housing as possible.63
The details of development, including the location, density level, income mix,
quality of construction, access to transportation networks, availability of
high-performing schools, and prospects for maintenance may be important, but
these are secondary to the primary goal of securing the government's role in
providing housing to low-income households on a long-term basis. The term
"anywhere-ists" is not meant to suggest an affirmative effort to locate
government housing in impoverished or segregated neighborhoods. Rather, it
refers to a phenomenon whereby the anywhere-ists will accept government
housing on segregated terms when the alternative is no housing at all. On the
other hand, the nowhere-ists most fear the potential that the anywhere-ists will
develop government-assisted housing next door.64 Accordingly, the first
priority for the nowhere-ists is to block government-assisted housing in all
forms.65 They may point to the abundant failures of government-housing
programs with respect to poor maintenance and mismanagement to justify their
fears of blight, crime, and lowered property values.66 Worse, the nowhere-ists
60. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: In
Search of a Just Public Housing Policy Post-Katrina, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1268-71 (2007)

(describing, within the context of the post-Katrina public-housing demolition controversy, the
perennial impulse to save or obtain whatever affordable units can be acquired, despite any
resulting segregation or discrimination); see also Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 444 (D. Md. 2005) (noting the desire of public-housing authorities in
Baltimore to "hous[e] as many as possible of the individuals and families that needed public
housing," and noting that the Baltimore Housing Commissioner said, "we were simply looking to
be able to put a roof over people's heads").
61. See infra Part V.B.
62. See infra Part V.A.
63. See Elizabeth K. Julian & Michael M. Daniel, Separate and Unequal-The Root and
Branch ofPublic Housing Segregation,23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 666, 668 (1989).
64. See Lolis E. Elie, Affordable Housing?
Not in My Backyard, Many Say,

TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) May 2, 2009, at A-I (discussing "residents' aversion to putting
affordable housing near them").
65. See, e.g., infra Part V.B (discussing the nowhere-ists' attempts to block housing in
Terrytown, Kenner, and Saint Bernard Parish).
66.

See GERRIT KNAPP ET AL., ZONING AS A BARRIER TO MULTIFAMILY HOUSING

DEVELOPMENT 51 (2007) (discussing community opposition to multifamily developments
resulting from a fear of decreased property values); see also Lolis E. Elie, Fears About Falling
Property Values Unfounded, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 2, 2009, at A-9 (noting
research that suggests that "the type of affordable housing matters less than the quality of the
properties' design, management and maintenance" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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may associate poor persons of color with historic management and
maintenance failures and even blame them for those failures.67 As a result,
many of these nowhere-ists associate neighborhood stability with racial and
socioeconomic homogeneity and are singularly focused on blocking
government-assisted housing in order to maintain that homogeneity.
It appears, then, that the "path of least resistance" for both groups is to allow
for the continued creation of government-assisted housing in impoverished,
isolated, or resegregating communities. In this scenario, the primary concerns
of both groups are addressed. The anywhere-ists achieve the development of
government-assisted housing.
The nowhere-ists keep it out of their
communities.
The other players in this seemingly inevitable path toward segregation are
the local-government representatives of impoverished and blighted
communities.
The housing- and community-development officials and
administrators of these communities are naturally looking for resources to hel
counteract blight and decline in the neighborhoods within their jurisdictions.
The impulse operating among community-development administrators in
disadvantaged neighborhoods is to secure any available resources for housing
redevelopment as part of the overall blight-busting strategy.
Prominent
among available federal community-development resources will be
HUD-funded programs for affordable housing and state-administered
tax-credit housing programs. 70 Thus, the high demand for affordable-housing
development dollars in impoverished and blighted communities, coupled with
the "path of least resistance" dynamic illustrated above, results in most
affordable-housing units being developed in communities that already have a
disproportionate amount of affordable-housing units relative to other
neighborhoods within the region.
In fact, the willingness of a local
government to accept government-assisted housing in a particular location
might be an indicator of that neighborhood's degree of blight.71 This tendency
to view affordable-housing programs primarily as blight-removal
programs-rather than as ladders of opportunity-has helped perpetuate
67.

See David D. Troutt, Katrina's Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable

Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 1109, 1133 (2008) ("Public housing ... is identified less with the
failures of governmental policies or democratically enforced prejudices and more with the poor
black residents concentrated within the projects.").
68. See Orfield, supra note 51, at 1752-53 (explaining that city leaders suggest that
"targeting affordable housing in poor neighborhoods can revitalize those neighborhoods" and
noting that "[s]egregated, fiscally poor cities need investment of any kind, and the [tax-credit
program] is virtually the only capital available to neighborhoods that have been effectively
redlined by the private market").
69. See id. But see id. at 1796 (discussing the prediction of some critics that using tax
credits to revitalize deeply distressed areas will fail).
70. See id at 1752-53.
71. See id.; Seicshnaydre, supra note 60, at 1271 (discussing the use of a "public housing
redevelopment agenda" to combat blight in neighborhoods).

674

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 60:661

segregation and the corresponding inequities that persist alongside residential
segregation.
This conflict reflects a fundamental failure of American housing policy with
respect to both its vision and its implementation at the federal, state, and local
levels.
The resulting "path of least resistance"-the provision of
government-assisted housing for low-income families outside of, or away
from, high-opportunity neighborhoods and communities-represents a kind of
toxic cocktail of market failure and government impotence. 2 This dynamic
has had enduring force in New Orleans both historically and presently.
III. THE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES NEW ORLEANS HAS FACED IN
ELIMINATING RACIAL SEGREGATION IN GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED HOUSING
PROGRAMS

Prior to Katrina, New Orleans not only mimicked the national pattern of
government-assisted housing programs serving as engines of poverty
concentration and segregation, but it also exceeded the national averages for
such poverty concentration. 73 Families participating in government-assisted
housing programs in the New Orleans area, who were overwhelmingly black,74
were living in poorer neighborhoods on average than their counterparts in the
nation's largest metropolitan areas.75 With uneven levels of poverty
concentration occurring throughout the city, poor blacks were more
concentrated in poor neighborhoods and had less access to middle-income
neighborhoods than their low-income white counterparts. 76
A. Vouchers

The Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCV) is currently the largest
rental-assistance program administered by HUD.
This program has the
potential to provide greater housing mobility to the consumer because the
subsidy can be used to rent an apartment in the private market.78 According to
a HUD study of housing-voucher use released in 2003, metro New Orleans had
72. See Mahoney, supra note 15, at 1259-60 (describing the complex interaction between
government policies and the market in promoting segregation). Notably, "[t]he history of public
housing in New Orleans demonstrates an enormous array of governmental and market
mechanisms that shaped the projects and their urban environment." Id. at 1283.
73. See infra Part III.A-D.
74. See infra Part III.A-D.
75. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
77. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING
CHOICE VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPANT AND NEIGHBORHOOD
WELFARE, at x (2003) [hereinafter HUD VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS REPORT]. The HCV is
the current tenant-based housing-subsidy program run by HUD; it was created in 1998, when a
separate voucher program merged with the Section 8 certificate program, which began in 1975.
Alberto F. Treviflo, Foreword to HUD VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS REPORT, supra, at iv.
78. HUD VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS REPORT, supra note 77, at vii.
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twice the percentage of voucher families living in neighborhoods with poverty
concentrations above 30% (46.9%), compared with voucher families in the top
fifty metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) (22%).79 Although New Orleans
follows the national pattern of a higher level of poverty concentration for
voucher use in central-city neighborhoods compared with suburban ones, the
level of concentration has been much higher in both the central city of New
Orleans as well as its suburbs. For example, in central-city neighborhoods in
the top fifty MSAs, 33.6% of voucher users lived in neighborhoods that were
above 30% poverty concentration, compared with over one-half (51.8%), for
the central city of New Orleans.8 On the other hand, although only 6.1% of
voucher users in the suburban neighborhoods of the top fifty MSAs lived in
neighborhoods above 30% poverty concentration, 82 a startling 40.4% of
voucher users in the suburbs of New Orleans lived in these high-poverty
neighborhoods.83 Research conducted post-Katrina indicates that voucher
discrimination could explain some of the concentration occurring in the
suburban-housing authorities to allow
program,84 as well as resistance by some
voucher holders to "cross parish lines."8 5
Given the high degree of poverty concentration in the New Orleans area
voucher program, the question arises whether the level of concentration is
occurring evenly for whites and blacks who use the program. Consistent with
national averages, black families using the voucher program in the greater
New Orleans area were more concentrated in high-poverty neighborhoods than
their white counterparts. 8 The starkest example of this phenomenon is evident
in families living in neighborhoods with a greater than 40% poverty
79. Id at 33, 40 tbl.111-9. HUD notes that families and neighborhoods are "negatively
affected" when the poverty-concentration levels reach 30%. Id. at 26. The 2003 HUD Voucher
Location Patterns Report relies on then-current characteristics of voucher holders, but
neighborhood characteristics were derived from the 1990 census. Id. at 3. The use of the term
"neighborhood" denotes the boundaries of census tracts. Id. at 122.
80. Id. at 27 tbl.Ill-1.
81. Id. at 34 tbl.Ill-2.
82. Id. at 27 tbl.III-1.
83. Id. at 34 tbl.Ill-2.
84. GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR Hous. ACTION CTR., HOUSING CHOICE IN CRISIS: AN
AUDIT REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER HOLDERS IN THE
GREATER NEW ORLEANS RENTAL HOUSING MARKET 8 (2009) (finding that, throughout the New

Orleans area, "[l]andlords denied voucher holders the opportunity to rent units eighty-two percent
(82%) of the time, either by outright refusal to accept vouchers or by the addition of
insurmountable requirements for voucher holders making it impossible for voucher holders to
rent units").
85. Id at 18 ("[The Housing Authority of New Orleans] currently accepts voucher transfers
from other jurisdictions in the region, however neighboring jurisdictions do not as readily accept
transfers. Therefore, voucher holders face limited regional choice, hampering economic and
racial integration on a regional level.").
86. HUD VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS REPORT, supra note 77, at 28 tbl.Ill-3.
87. Id. at 36 tbl.1l-5.
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concentration. Only 1.8% of white families using vouchers in the New
Orleans MSA lived in such extreme povert8 concentration, compared with
21.3% of black households using vouchers.
When compared with the top
fifty MSAs, white voucher users in the New Orleans metro area were half as
likely to experience extreme-poverty concentration, whereas black voucher
users in the New Orleans metro area were twice as likely to experience such
extreme concentration.89
B. Public Housing andProject-BasedSection 8 Subsidies

When considering public housing, project-based Section 8 programs, and
voucher programs prior to Katrina, there was greater poverty concentration in
the New Orleans metro area, on average, than in the top fifty MSAs. 90 The
level of poverty concentration increases when the three are compared
individually. For example, 46.9% of voucher users in the New Orleans metro
area lived in neighborhoods of over 30% poverty concentration, 78.9% of all
project-based Section 8 housing tenants lived in such neighborhoods, and an
eye-popping 97.4% of public-housing residents lived in such neighborhoods. 9 1
This compares with 22.2% of voucher users, 44.4% of Section 8 project-based
tenants, and 66.1% of public-housing residents living in over 30% poverty
concentration in the nation's top fifty MSAs.92 Stated another way, the
average neighborhood-poverty rate for public-housing residents in New
Orleans in 2000 was 74%,93 nearly double the poverty rate associated with
neighborhoods of "extreme poverty" 94 and 2.5 times the poverty rate for the
City of New Orleans. 9 5
C. Low Income Housing Tax Credit

The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program, the nation's largest
low-income-housing production program, was a principal means of restoring
88. Id. Notably, blacks (non-Hispanic) made up the vast majority, or 93.2%, of the 7864
total voucher users in the New Orleans MSA at the time of this study, with whites representing
only 5.5% of total voucher users. Id. at app. B-1.
89. See id at 28 tbl.Ill-3, 36 tbl.111-5. In the top fifty MSAs nationally, 3.5% of whites
lived in neighborhoods that had concentrations of poverty greater than 40%, and 10.6% of blacks
lived in such neighborhoods. Id. If voucher users who lived in New Orleans metro
neighborhoods with greater than 30% poverty concentration are included, the numbers jump to
nearly 26% for whites and 47.8% for blacks. Id. at tbl.III-5.
90. Id at 31 tbl.Ill-8, 40 tbl.Ill-9.
91.

Id at 40 tbl.Ill-9.

92.

Id. at 31 tbl.Ill-8.

93.
94.

BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 3, at 5.
Id. at 3 tbl.1 (defining "extreme-poverty neighborhoods" as those neighborhoods that

had more than 40% of residents living below the poverty line).
95.

U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU,

State

&

County

Quickfacts,

New

Orleans,

LA,

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/2255000.html (last updated July 8, 2009) (reporting that
New Orleans's poverty rate in 2000 was 28%).
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rental housing to the New Orleans area after Hurricane Katrina. 96 A study
examining the neighborhood locations of family LIHTC developments
between 1995 and 2001 reveals that, in pre-Katrina metro New Orleans, no
tax-credit units with at least 2 bedrooms were placed in the lowest-poverty
census tracts (between 0% and 10% poverty concentration), compared with a
rate of 41.3% nationally. 97 New Orleans was the only metro area in the
nation's top fifty metro areas to have no tax-credit units in the lowest-poverty
neighborhoods during this pre-Katrina period.98 Southern cities such as
Atlanta (32%), Charlotte (71.5%), Houston (26.2%), and Nashville (64.3%) all
managed to place tax-credit units in their lowest-poverty neighborhoods over
the same time frame. 99 On the other hand, 44% of tax-credit units in the metro
New Orleans area in 2000 were located in high-poverty neighborhoods. 00
This represents the second-highest level of poverty concentration in the nation
when considering the top one hundred metro areas with the largest numbers of
tax-credit units.
Thus, prior to Katrina, metro New Orleans was not using
the tax-credit program to counteract the high-poverty concentrations existing in
all of the other government-assisted housing programs; rather, the tax-credit
program appeared to follow the same patterns of concentration and segregation
that existed in all the other public-housing and voucher programs.102
D. Unsubsidized Housing

Significantly, the level of poverty concentration for families assisted by
federal-housing programs is much greater than for those who live in
96. Amilda Dymi, LIHTC Viewed as Helpful to Regions Recovering from Hurricanes,
NAT'L MORTG. NEWS, May 22, 2006, at 11.
97. KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 50, at 13 ex. 11, 15 tbl.12. This study sought to compare
the locational decisions of families with children using housing vouchers and the placement of
LIHTC units occupied by families. See id. at 13-16. Because the LIHTC program does not keep
data relative to family occupancy, the study uses units of two bedrooms or more as a proxy for
family occupancy. Id. at 4.
98. Id at 14-15 tbl.12. Six percent of families using vouchers in the New Orleans metro
area used them in census tracts with between zero- and ten-percent poverty. Id. at 15 tbl. 12.
99. Id at 14-15 tbl.12; see also Orfield, supra note 50, at 1782-83 (noting that tax-credit
units appear to be less segregative in the South and West).
100. LANCE FREEMAN, SITING AFFORDABLE HOUSING: LOCATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD
TRENDS OF Low INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT DEVELOPMENTS INTHE 1990S app. D, at 14-16
(Brookings Institution 2004).
101. Id
102. The Louisiana Housing Finance Agency has made efforts post-Katrina to create
incentives for tax-credit developments to be placed in areas that have been traditionally difficult
to develop, including areas near commercial and public services and areas "in which the median
LA. HOUS. FIN.
income of the census tract exceeds 120% of the area median income."
AGENCY, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: RESERVATIONS OF PER
47-48,
available
CAPITA CREDIT CEILING FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2007-2008
at http://www.novoco.com/low income housing/resource files/qap/louisiana finalpercapita_0
7.pdf. However, the resistance of parishes outside Orleans to tax-credit developments has
undermined these poverty-deconcentration goals. See infra notes 164-72.
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unsubsidized, affordable housing.' 0 3 For example, only 16.5% of unsubsidized
households nationally and 40.3% of unsubsidized households in the New
Orleans metro area live in neighborhoods with a greater than 30% poverty
concentration, compared with larger percentages in all other HUD-subsidized
programs. 1' Thus, blacks in New Orleans prior to Katrina have been forced to
weigh the trade-off described in Part II-the families receive housing
subsidies, but pay a heavy price in the form of increased poverty concentration
and likely worse neighborhood conditions. 0 5
E. Who Bears the Costs ofRacial and Economic Segregation?

When considering the New Orleans population generally prior to Katrina,
Orleans Parish was a portrait of racial segregation. Despite the national trend
in the 1990s toward decreasing segregation, 6 New Orleans between 1980 and
2000 became more racially segregated, with the average black resident in 2000
living in a neighborhood where 82% of fellow residents were black. 0 7
Further, in 2000, blacks were not settled uniformly across the metropolitan
area.1os For example, although 60.1% of households in Orleans Parish were
black in 2000, only 33.4% of New Orleans MSA households were black, and
only 6.1% of households in Saint Bernard Parish were black. 109
What have been the consequences of racial segregation for residents of New
Orleans? Are whites and blacks similarly segregated by income? 1 0 The 2000
103. HUD VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS REPORT, supra note 77, at 31 tbl.III-8,
40 tbl.III-9. HUD defined "affordable housing" in its 2003 study as units with rents set at or
below the metropolitan area Fair Market Rents, which are roughly those "units costing up to the
40th percentile of rents for the metropolitan area, controlling for bedroom size." Id. at 8 & n.5.
The vast majority of renters live in unsubsidized housing. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES,
HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY
13 (2008) ("More than 80 percent of all renters, as well as more than 70 percent of renters with
incomes in the lowest quartile, live in privately owned, unsubsidized housing.").
104. HUD VOUCHER LOCATION PATTERNS REPORT, supra note 77, at 31 tbl. 111-8,
40 tbl.III-9.
105. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text; see also Mahoney, supra note 15, at
1281 (noting that one federally funded private development decreased its maintenance staff upon
the arrival of the first black tenants).
106. THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN
AMERICA 8 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).
107. BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 3, at 3.
108. Motion to Enforce Judgment by Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center
attach. 3 at 6, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d
563 (E.D. La. 2009) (No. 2:06-cv-07185-HGB-SS), ECF No. 126-3 [hereinafter Bradford
Declaration].
109. Id at 7 (calculating data from information provided by the U.S. Census Bureau).
110. This Article focuses on the respective situations of blacks and whites, as opposed to any
other groups, because New Orleans immediately prior to Katrina could be characterized as largely
biracial. See Fussell, supra note 15, at 846-55 (2007) (discussing the assimilation of Latin and
Asian immigrants prior to Katrina and noting that "[t]he biracial dynamic of the city was hardly
challenged by the small numbers of Latin American migrants-mostly Cubans, Hondurans,
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U.S. Census data show that blacks living in New Orleans, regardless of
income, were more concentrated in high-poverty neighborhoods than the
overall average of people concentrated in high-poverty neighborhoods."' On
the other hand, low-income whites in the New Orleans metro area have had
greater access to low-poverty, middle-income neighborhoods than any other
low-income group in the metro area.112 As noted by Sheryll Cashin, "By
allowing them to live in more socioeconomically integrated settings, American
society tends to afford the white poor a chance at upward mobility that it
denies many of its poor black and Latino citizens." 1 3
By 2000, roughly one-quarter of New Orleans's neighborhoods were
considered to be ones of "extreme poverty"-that is, at least 40% of their
residents had family incomes below the federal poverty line.1 4 The
percentage of people living in neighborhoods of extreme poverty in New
Orleans (37.7%)' is not a mere reflection of general high-poverty rates in the
city given that, in 2000, the poverty rate was 28% in the City of New Orleans
and 18% for the metro area.116 Further, low-income blacks (42.6%) lived in
these neighborhoods of extreme poverty in New Orleans at roughly four times
the rate of low-income whites (10.9%)." ' When considering the New Orleans
metro area as a whole before Katrina, low-income blacks (32%) lived in
neighborhoods of extreme poverty at a rate ten times greater than that of
low-income whites (3%). 18
The effects of extreme-poverty concentration have been well-documented
and include multiple human costs such as reduced private-market activity,
Mexicans, and Nicaraguans-that arrived in the city at distinct moments in the mid-twentieth
century and the Vietnamese migrants that arrived in the late 1970s").
111. See BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing the increased concentration of
blacks within high-poverty neighborhoods and showing that 42.6% of blacks lived in
concentrated poverty, as compared to 37.7% of whites).
112. See supra Part ll.A-D.
113. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 246 (2004); see also Troutt, supra note 67, at 1134 n. 113
("White poverty is simply not spatially comparable to black poverty in its character and
concentrations."); supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
114. BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 3, at 3. New Orleans as of 2000 ranked second highest in
the nation for its percentage of poor people living in extreme-poverty neighborhoods. Id at 3
tbl. 1.
115. Id. at app. A, at 10.
DP-3,
PROFILE OF SELECTED ECONOMIC
BUREAU,
TABLE
116. U.S.
CENSUS
CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 (NEW ORLEANS, LA MSA) (2000); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE
DP-3, PROFILE OF SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 (NEW ORLEANS CITY,

LOUISIANA) (2000).
117. BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 3, at app. A, at 10.
118. FAIR HOUS. JUSTICE CTR., POVERTY LEVELS REPORT: POPULATION BELOW POVERTY
OF
AREA;
NEW
AND
BY
POVERTY
CONCENTRATION
LEVEL
BY
RACE
ORLEANS-METAIRIE-KENNER, LA METRO (2010) [hereinafter FAIR HOUS. JUSTICE CTR., METRO
NEW ORLEANS] (on file with author).
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jobs, public services, and wealth-building opportunities, as well as limited
educational opportunity, negative health impacts, and increased crime.' 19 But,
what about neighborhoods of low poverty? How may they be characterized?
HUD has defined a "low-poverty neighborhood" as "a census tract in which
fewer than 10 percent of the residents live in households with incomes below
the poverty line." 20 Some commentators have described these neighborhoods
as "solidly middle class" with a majority (over 75%) of the residents owning
homes and a miniscule number (1.6%) on public assistance.121 A healthy
majority of Americans in metro areas (58%) lived in low-poverty
neighborhoods in 2000.122 When considering neighborhoods with between
10% and 20% of residents living in households with incomes below the
poverty line, a majority own homes, and only 4% receive public assistance. 123
Twenty-four percent of Americans live in these neighborhoods. 12 4 Thus, 82%
of the U.S. metropolitan population in 2000 lived in what could be
characterized as middle-class neighborhoods.
Low-income whites before Katrina had overwhelmingly greater access to
these low-poverty, middle-income neighborhoods in metro New Orleans than
did low-income blacks. In fact, low-income whites (30%) were fifteen times
more likely than low-income blacks (2%) to live in the lowest-poverty
neighborhoods of metro New Orleans-meaning those neighborhoods with
less than 10% of people living in below-poverty households. 1 This disparity
is greater in metro New Orleans than in any of the thirty-five largest
metropolitan areas of the United States.126 Moreover, in Orleans Parish, only
1%of low-income blacks lived in the lowest-poverty neighborhoods.1 27
Interestingly, low-income whites lived in middle-income neighborhoods in
metro New Orleans, pre-Katrina, nearly as often as Americans as a whole
across all income groups. When considering middle-income neighborhoods at
less than 20% poverty, the vast majority (72%) of low-income whites in the
119. See BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 3, at 5-7 (discussing the multiple human costs of
concentrated poverty); see also Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Housing and Neighborhood
Choice: Discriminationand Segregation in U.S. Housing Markets, 41 IND. L. REV. 797, 809-13

(2008) (discussing the ways in which housing segregation limits access to economic opportunity).
120.

KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 50, at 3.

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id (using figures from the 2000 Census).
Id
Id at 3-4.
Id at 4.

125. FAIR Hous. JUSTICE CTR., METRO NEW ORLEANS, supra note 118.
126. See DIANE L. HOUK ET AL., INCREASING ACCESS TO LOW-POVERTY AREAS BY
CREATING MIXED-INCOME HOUSING app. A, at 82-83 (2007) (exhibiting that, in the United
States as a whole, 36% of low-income white households had access to low-poverty
neighborhoods, and only 9% of low-income blacks had the same access).
127. FAIR Hous. JUSTICE CTR., POVERTY LEVELS REPORT: POPULATION BELOW POVERTY
LEVEL BY RACE AND BY POVERTY CONCENTRATION OF AREA; LOUISIANA, ORLEANS PARISH
(2010) [hereinafter FAIR HOus. JUSTICE CTR., ORLEANS PARISH] (on file with author).
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New Orleans metro area lived in these neighborhoods, compared with only
19% of low-income blacks.1 2 8
Despite the significant racial disparities with regard to access to
middle-income neighborhoods throughout the metro area, low-income groups
in general seemed to fare better in the New Orleans suburbs pre-Katrina than in
the City of New Orleans.1 2 9 For example, in urban Orleans Parish, only 12%
of low-income blacks lived in middle-income neighborhoods with below 20%
poverty.o30 On the other hand, in Jefferson Parish, the suburban parish
adjacent to Orleans, 33% of low-income blacks lived in neighborhoods of less
In Saint Tammany Parish, across Lake Pontchartrain
than 20% poverty.
from Orleans, 63% of low-income blacks lived in these neighborhoods.' 3 2
Low-income whites in suburban New Orleans had overwhelming access to
middle-income neighborhoods; in Jefferson Parish, 80% of low-income whites
lived in neighborhoods below 20% poverty and, in Saint Tammany Parish, a
whopping 93% of low-income whites lived in these middle-income
neighborhoods. 3 3
Thus, although low-income blacks before Hurricane Katrina were more
likely to have access to a middle-class neighborhood in suburban New Orleans
than in Orleans Parish, they had far less access to middle-income
neighborhoods throughout the metro area when compared with low-income
Given the concentration of government-assisted housing in
whites.
high-poverty neighborhoods in the New Orleans metro area,134 which exceeds
national averages,' 35 it appears that government-assisted housing programs in
New Orleans have operated as engines of segregation and poverty
concentration, rather than as gateways of opportunity for low-income blacks.
Although the cataloguing of the effects of segregation, both racial and
socioeconomic, is beyond the scope of this Article, it is at least worth stating
the assumption embedded here: the effects of segregation have not been
128.

FAIR HOUS. JUSTICE CTR., METRO NEW ORLEANS, supra note 118.

129.

Not surprisingly, the percentage of individuals living below the poverty line decreases

outside of extreme-poverty neighborhoods in Orleans Parish from 54.6% to 21.6%. BERUBE &
KATZ, supra note 3, at 4 tbl.2. When considering the metro area outside of Orleans Parish, the
rate decreases to 13.1%. Id.
130. FAIR Hous. JUSTICE CTR., ORLEANS PARISH, supra note 127.
131. FAIR Hous. JUSTICE CTR., POVERTY LEVELS REPORT: POPULATION BELOW POVERTY
LEVEL BY RACE AND BY POVERTY CONCENTRATION OF AREA; LOUISIANA, JEFFERSON PARISH
(2010) [hereinafter FAIR HOUS. JUSTICE CTR., JEFFERSON PARISH] (on file with author).
132. FAIR HoUs. JUSTICE CTR., POVERTY LEVELS REPORT: POPULATION BELOW POVERTY
LEVEL BY RACE AND BY POVERTY CONCENTRATION OF AREA; LOUISIANA, ST. TAMMANY
PARISH (2010) [hereinafter FAIR Hous. JUSTICE CTR., ST. TAMMANY PARISH] (on file with
author).
133. FAIR HoUs. JUSTICE CTR., JEFFERSON PARISH; FAIR HOUS. JUSTICE CTR., ST.
TAMMANY PARISH.
134. See supraPart 1I.A-D.
135. See supraPart II.A-D.
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neutral. The concentration of low-income black children in high-poverty
neighborhoods in New Orleans has had an impact on the life chances of these
children. New Orleans blacks were "consistently far less likely than whites to
complete secondary school" during the first half of the twentieth century and
continuing through to the present, which has in turn diminished labor-market
opportunities.136 Blacks have largely occupied the low-skill, low-wage labor
force in the New Orleans tourist-based economy,' 37 which has made housing in
communities of opportunity unaffordable for them, thus continuing the cycle of
inequity in housing, education, and employment.
IV. THE OPPORTUNITY HURRICANE KATRINA PRESENTED TO REVERSE
RACIALLY SEGREGATED HOUSING PATTERNS

In the aftermath of the devastation that cost lives and destroyed property
across the metropolitan area, Hurricane Katrina presented New Orleans with an
opportunity for a "do over" in at least one respect. For decades, New Orleans
battled crushing poverty that fell disproportionately on its black population.,3 8
This multigenerational poverty thrived in highly racially segregated
neighborhoods beset by low-performing schools, high crime rates, and limited
access to healthy neighborhood amenities-that is, neighborhoods possessing
few opportunities for their residents.1 39 In the wake of the hurricane though,
New Orleans was presented with an unprecedented level of federal resources
that could be used to undo entrenched patterns of racial residential segregation
and the poverty that inevitably accompanies segregation.1 40

136.

Fussell, supra note 15, at 851; see also Mahoney, supra note 15, at 1271, 1278-79

(discussing the roles labor-market discrimination and the exodus of jobs from New Orleans
played in creating joblessness among public-housing residents).
137. Fussell, supra note 15, at 851.
138. Xavier de Souza Briggs, Entrenched Poverty, Social Mixing, and the "Geography of
Opportunity": Lessons for Policy and Unanswered Questions, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &

POL'Y 403, 406 (2006) ("Historically black neighborhoods with high rates of poverty
concentration, having been isolated from economic opportunity for decades, were now isolated
from critical aid and escape routes as the powerful storm gathered.").
139. The history of racial residential segregation in New Orleans is beyond the scope of this
Article, but it has been thoroughly explored by Martha Mahoney and David D. Troutt. See
Mahoney, supra note 15, at 1283-84 (describing the twenty-five-year long segregation in New
Orleans public housing, which "increas[ed] residential segregation in the city"; noting the federal
financing and underwriting of apartment and new home construction in white-only
neighborhoods, which had a "profound ghettoizing effect on the modem city"; and describing
market processes, such as housing discrimination and the loss of jobs, which helped perpetuate
segregation); Troutt, supra note 67, at 1141 ("Race neutral land use regulation reproduced the
patterns of racial inequality that slavery, Jim Crow, and segregation inscribed.").
140. See BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that, in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, "local and regional leaders will have an unprecedented opportunity to rebuild a New
Orleans that is more inclusive, more sustainable, and more economically healthy than its
predecessor").
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In the early days of the post-Katrina recovery period, plans emerged that
suggested that not all of New Orleans should be rebuilt. Property owners in
certain low-lying neighborhoods were aghast at the notion that their
communities might be designated as "green space" neighborhoods.141
Presumably, these owners would be forced to sell their low-lying properties
and relocate to higher ground.142 Neighborhood groups targeted for "green
spacing" quickly organized and fought the suggestion that not all property
owners would be permitted to return and rebuild.143 Rebuilding then ensued in
single-family, owner-occupied neighborhoods in a highly decentralized,
unregulated manner, and at varying rates and levels.144
The post-Katrina recovery story for rental housing is markedly different.
Although representative governments of low-lying neighborhoods quickly
understood that any suggestion of limiting the rebuilding of flood-damaged,
single-family neighborhoods would constitute political suicide, the proposed
use of a local government's regulatory power to "green space"
multifamily-housing com lexes seemed to gamer valuable political capital for
locally elected officials.'I
V. DESPITE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DESEGREGATE, THE REGION APPEARS
POISED TO RECREATE RACIALLY SEGREGATED HOuSING PATTERNS

As some commentators have stated, "[c]oncentrated poverty is not an
inevitable phenomenon." 46 And yet, our segregated past, present, and future
may be linked by the same enduring fears, policies, and customs. Without a
better understanding of our history, we seem destined to repeat it. Because the
141. Michelle Krupa, Many Areas Marked for Green Space After Hurricane Katrina Have
Rebounded, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New
Orleans)
(Aug.
23,
2010,
9:00
PM),

www.nola.com/Katrina/index.ssf/2010/08/manyareasmarked-for
katrina have rebounded.html.
142. Id

greenspace-afterhurricane

143.

Id.

144.

See Matthew Scott, After Katrina, the New Orleans Population Goes Upscale, DAILY

FIN. (Aug. 28, 2010, 10:10 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/post-katrina-demographicshifts-could-boost-rebuilding-efforts-il19609776/ (noting that more affluent residents were able to
return to New Orleans and rebuild "in greater numbers than other population segments" and that
those who were not financially stable were unable to rebuild as quickly).
145. See, e.g., Ariella Cohen, Complex Issue: Kenner Apartment Ban
Affordable-Housing Advocates, NEW ORLEANS
CITYBUSINESS
(Apr.
12,

Angers
2008,

1:00 AM), http://neworleanscity business.com/blog/2008/04/12/complex-issue-kenner-apartmentban-angers-affordablehousing-advocates-2/ (reporting that a multifamily-development ban in
Kenner would keep a fifteen-acre demolished apartment-complex site "an open grassy field" for
at least another year); Deon Roberts, Roberts Opposes Blighted Apartment Rehab, NEW ORLEANS
CITYBUSINESS (May 29, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://neworleanscitybusiness.com/blog/2007/

[hereinafter Roberts, Blighted Apartment
05/29/roberts-opposes-blighted-apartment-rehab/
Rehab] (describing an elected official's desire to eliminate rental housing in Terrytown in favor
of "green space").
146.

BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 3, at 4.
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"path of least resistance" has served as the operating principle for post-Katrina
rebuilding decisions, 14 7 the region appears to be recreating its racially
segregated housing patterns.
A. Anywhere-ists

The need for affordable workforce housing in the post-Katrina recovery
period has been acute. HUD proposed to demolish 5000 units of public
housing throughout the city without replacing them all in the redevelopment
The devastation of over 200,000 single-family homes and
process.148
multifamily rentals, along with a large influx of recovery-related workers,
created an enormous demand for rental housing.149 Both median rents and
median incomes increased. According to one study of the New Orleans metro
area, the median gross rent rose 27%, from $676 in 2004 to $856 in 2007.150
In Orleans Parish, median gross rents rose 44% over the same period. 5 1
Nationally, rents rose only 4% during this time.' 52 Although median incomes
also increased,' 53 fewer workers earning less than $20,000 lived in the New
Orleans area in 2007, while job vacancies remained high in occupations paying
less than $20,000.154 Further, the proportion of renters to homeowners in
metro New Orleans fell from 39% to 34% between 2004 and 2007, supgesting
that many displaced, low-income renters were unable to return home.' 5
147. See infra Part V.
148.

See Leslie G. Fields, One Heckuva Snafu: The Environmental Justice Implications of

Katrina, 33 HUM. RTs., Fall 2006, at 5, 5 ("[T]he Department of Housing and Urban
Development-the Housing Authority of New Orleans is in receivership-plans to demolish
5,000 units, with no clear plan for bringing back the [black] families who once inhabited them.").
For a separate discussion of the fair-housing issues surrounding the demolition of the "Big Four"
public-housing developments in the City of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, see
generally Seicshnaydre, supra note 60; see also Judith Browne-Dianis & Anita Sinha, Exiling the
Poor: The Clash ofRedevelopment and FairHousing in Post-KatrinaNew Orleans, 51 HOw. L.J.

481, 505 (2008) (discussing the inadequacy of replacing public-housing units with vouchers in
post-Katrina New Orleans and noting that "[t]he dearth of affordable housing coupled with
discrimination against [blacks] renders vouchers an utterly inadequate way to provide housing
opportunities in New Orleans for displaced public housing residents").
149. POLICYLINK, BRINGING LOUISIANA RENTERS HOME: AN EVALUATION OF THE
2006-2007 GULF OPPORTUNITY ZONE RENTAL HOUSING RESTORATION PROGRAM 7 (2007).
150. ALLISON PLYER ET AL., GREATER NEW ORLEANS CMTY. DATA CTR., CHANGES IN
NEW ORLEANS METRO AREA HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: BASED ON 2004 AND 2007 AMERICAN

COMMUNITY

SURVEY

DATA

11

(2009),

available at http://www.gnocdc.org/Housing

Affordability/ (follow "Download Full Report" hyperlink).
151.

Id at 12.

152. Id at I1.
153.

Id at 10-11.

154. Id. at 10; see also BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, THE HOUSE THAT UNCLE
SAM BUILT: THE CONTINUED EXPANSION OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN NEW ORLEANS 5 (2009)

(noting higher housing prices post-Katrina as well as an increase in the region's median hourly
wage, rising from $13.00 to $16.83 per hour).
155. PLYER ETAL., supra note 150, at 10.
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Renters in post-Katrina New Orleans struggled more with affordability than
renters nationwide, according to the 2007 American Community Survey Data.
Although 49% of all renters nationally paid more than 30% of their income on
housing prices-a figure that, according to standards used by HIUD and others
that
prices
were
burdens,
indicates
measuring
housing-price
unaffordable 156-54% of renters throughout the metropolitan New Orleans
area paid unaffordable housing prices, and 60% of renters in Orleans Parish
With respect to suburban parishes, Saint
paid unaffordable housing prices.
Tammany Parish renters were particularly strained, with 61% paying
unaffordable housing prices,' 58 and Jefferson Parish renters were comparable
to the national rate, with 51% of residents paying unaffordable rental-housing
prices relative to income.1 59 According to the Greater New Orleans
Community Data Center, "[r]ental affordability is particularly critical in
Orleans because 48 percent of households are renters, as compared with only
21 percent in Saint Tammany and 33 percent nationwide."l 60
Given the urgent need for rental housing following Katrina, advocates urged
that a maximum number of rental units be developed as replacements for those
that were lost. Despite this, only 27% of damaged rental units were slated for
replacement with public dollars in the metro New Orleans area as of 2008.
Moreover, only 2600 units scheduled for replacement using public subsidies
were open for occupancy statewide as of mid-2008.162 When considering
affordable units, only 17,112 of the 53,210 affordable rental units with severe

156. Id at 3, 8-9. Although measuring housing affordability for residents already resettled in
New Orleans is important and helpful, this indicator of affordability excludes households that
have not been able to return to New Orleans or to afford the rental housing that is available, such
as "displaced households priced out of the market, homeless families and those squatting in
blighted buildings." See id. at 3. Housing prices include the cost of utilities. Id.
157. Id. at 8-9 (noting that the percentage of renters in the metropolitan area paying
unaffordable housing prices in 2007 was up to 54%, six percentage points higher than the 2004
pre-Katrina rate of 48%). Notably, "no single minimum-wage earner working 40 hours a week,
52 weeks a year, earns enough to cover the cost of a modest rental anywhere in the country."
JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES, supra note 103, at 2.
158. PLYER ET AL., supra note 150, at 10.
159. Id. at 9 fig.6.
160. Id. at 9.
161. KALIMA ROSE ET AL., POLICYLINK, A LONG WAY HOME: THE STATE OF HOUSING
RECOVERY IN LOUISIANA 8 (2008), available at http://policylink.info/threeyearslater/equity
atlas.pdf. For purposes of determining the level of rental housing likely to be replaced, this study
considered units with funding allocations from government programs, including the Gulf
Opportunity (GO) Zone LlHTC Program and Small Rental Property Program (SRPP), less than
half of which represent units that are completed, are under construction, or have closed financing.
Id at 9. The authors did not include units scheduled for repair with private-insurance proceeds.

Id.
162.

Id. at 9.
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or major damage (32%) were in the pipeline for replacement in metro New
Orleans as of mid-2008. 6
Projections concerning the location of these replacement rental units suggest
that the "path of least resistance" has emerged as the operating principle for the
location of government-assisted housing in post-Katrina New Orleans. As
time passed, nearly all of the suburban parishes surrounding Orleans insisted
that they had "enough" rental housing and did not need new development of
such housing.164 Yet, when individual parishes are examined, it appears that
Orleans Parish, the parish with the highest proportion of rental housing prior to
the storm,165 had the highest percentage (33%) of rental housing scheduled to
be replaced with public subsidies.166 On the other hand, the predominately
middle-class parishes with smaller proportions of rental units prior to the
storm-Jefferson, Plaquemines, Saint Bernard, and Saint Tammany-had even
lower projections for replacement of the rental housing they had lost.167 For
example, Jefferson Parish had 13,972 rental units damaged, but only 1840
Saint Bernard
(13%) scheduled for replacement with public subsidies. 1
Parish had 5936 rental units damaged, but only 924 (16%) scheduled for
replacement with public subsidies.'
When the subset of affordable rental
housing is examined, it appears that Orleans Parish was slated to replace 37%
of its affordable units, with Jefferson and Saint Bernard only slated to replace
17% and 22% of their affordable units, respectively.170 Stated another way, of
163. Id. at 17. For purposes of this calculation, data was derived using the five parishes of
Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, Saint Bernard, and Saint Tammany.
164. See infra Part V.B (discussing resistance against efforts to build rental housing). The
demand for rental housing does not necessarily correspond to the demand for subsidized housing.
See Katy Reckdahl, Does New Orleans Have Too Much Subsidized Housing?, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Oct. 11, 2009, at A-I (noting a report commissioned by the Louisiana Housing
Finance Agency that "projected a continuing, unmet demand for subsidized units through 2012").
165. According to the 2000 Census, over one-half (53.5%) of the occupied housing units in
Orleans Parish were renter occupied, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QT-H2 TENURE, HOUSEHOLD SIZE,
AND AGE OF HOUSEHOLDER: 2000 (ORLEANS PARISH, LOUISIANA) (2000), compared with a
metro-area average of 38.2%, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QT-H2 TENURE, HOUSEHOLD SIZE, AND
AGE OF HOUSEHOLDER: 2000 (NEW ORLEANS, LA MSA) (2000), and lower percentages in
surrounding parishes-specifically, 36.1% in Jefferson, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QT-H2 TENURE,
HOUSEHOLD SIZE, AND AGE OF HOUSEHOLDER: 2000 (JEFFERSON PARISH, LOUISIANA) (2000),
21.1% in Plaquemines, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QT-H2 TENURE, HOUSEHOLD SIZE, AND AGE OF
HOUSEHOLDER: 2000 (PLAQUEMINES PARISH, LOUISIANA) (2000), 25.4% in Saint Bernard, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, QT-H2 TENURE, HOUSEHOLD SIZE, AND AGE OF HOUSEHOLDER: 2000 (ST.
BERNARD PARISH, LOUISIANA) (2000), and 19.5% in Saint Tammany, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
QT-H2 TENURE, HOUSEHOLD SIZE, AND AGE OF HOUSEHOLDER: 2000 (ST. TAMMANY PARISH,
LOUISIANA) (2000).
166. ROSE ET AL., supra note 161, at 9.

167. Id.
168. Id
169. Id.
170. Id. at 17. Orleans Parish was slated to replace 14,004 affordable rental units out of
37,790 such units with severe or major damage; Jefferson Parish was slated to replace 1414
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the 7474 affordable tax-credit units scheduled for replacement in the metro
New Orleans area as of mid-2008, 6268, or 84%, were slated to be developed
in Orleans Parish. 171 Thus, rather than using the recovery as an opportunity to
correct historic, regional imbalances with regard to the proportion of rental to
owner-occupied housing, poverty concentrations, or racial segregation, the
region is poised to use the recovery as a means of accelerating these
imbalances.
There is no question that the need for affordable housing in New Orleans
following the storms was, and remains, enormous. Yet, the great need for
low-income housing cannot continue to be used as a justification for the
inequity and segregation that results from these programs.172 As one circuit
court stated, "The affirmative duty to consider the impact of publicly assisted
housing programs on racial concentration and to act affirmatively to promote
the policy of fair, integrated housing is not to be put aside whenever racial
minorities are willing to accept segregated housing." 73 Typically, "[i]n order
to get the affordability benefit of federal housing assistance, low-income Black
families must accept a higher level of both substandard living conditions and
racial inequality than exists for very low-income Black tenants not using HUD
rental assistance. Low-income Whites do not have to make this trade-off."174
Further, as those working for more equitable and inclusive communities have
recognized, "[i]ncreasing the supply of affordable housing is essential to
improving housing opportunity, but achieving racial equity will require more.
To reach equity goals, affordable units must be spread across the region."175

affordable rental units out of 8515 such units with severe or major damage; and Saint Bernard
Parish was slated to replace 869 affordable rental units out of 3935 such units with severe or
major damage. Id
171. Id. (reflecting activity in Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, Saint Bernard, and Saint
Tammany Parishes). Similarly, 7736 of the projected 9638 Small Rental program units, or 80%,
were slated for development in Orleans Parish. Id.
172. Clients' Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1423 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting HUD's
argument that its continued funding of discriminatory housing practices was a necessary evil
implicit in its efforts to provide low-income housing); United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination
Ctr. of Metro N.Y. v. Westchester County, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("As a
matter of logic, providing more affordable housing for a low income racial minority will improve
its housing stock but may do little to change any pattern of discrimination or segregation.
Addressing that pattern would at a minimum necessitate an analysis of where the additional
housing is placed."); Gautreaux 1, 296 F. Supp. 907, 914 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (stating that the
"praiseworthy and urgent goals of low cost housing" do not justify the "deliberate policy to
separate the races") (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)), aj'd, 136
F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970).
173. Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).
174. Julian & Daniel, supra note 47, at 6.
175. Angela Glover Blackwell & Judith Bell, Equitable Developmentfor a Stronger Nation:
Lessons from the Field, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 289, 290 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).
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B. Nowhere-ists

For decades, local governments and their constituents have sought veto
power over the entry of nonhomogeneous groups and housing into their
communities. For example, a 1924 ordinance that was later repealed
[made] it unlawful for any white person to establish his home or
residence in a negro community, or portion of the city inhabited
principally by negroes, or for any negro to establish his home or
residence in a white community, or portion of the city inhabited
principally by white people, "except on the written consent of a

majority of the persons of the opposite race inhabiting such
community, or portion of the city to be affected."' 76
A councilman of Jefferson Parish stated in 2006, "With the number of jobs
out there, nobody should be on public housing unless you're ignorant or
lazy."1 7 7 And in 2007, state legislation was proposed that provided that "[t]he
[Louisiana Housing Finance Agency] shall have no authority to approve or
allocate housing tax credits or to approve or implement any housing program
within a parish

without the prior approval of the parish governing

authority."1 78 This legislative initiative died on the vine, but it demonstrates
the enduring quest to exclude subsidized housing by means of a local veto.1 79
In the uncertainty of the post-Katrina New Orleans rebuilding landscape,
fear of neighborhood change has been palpable: "You hear people say we
don't want any multifamily because there is a perception that (the buildings)

176. Tyler v. Harmon, 104 So. 200, 200, 203 (La. 1925) (emphasis added) (upholding a New
Orleans ordinance that mandated segregation in residential neighborhoods absent neighborhood
approval for an interracial population on the basis of the "separate but equal" doctrine announced
in Plessy v. Ferguson). After a second appeal, the case was overturned under the authority of
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (per curiam). Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
New Orleans passed its segregation ordinance pursuant to authority granted by the Louisiana
legislature, which authorized segregation ordinances in 1912 and enacted bans on integration for
municipalities of over 25,000 in 1924. See Tyler, 104 So. at 200-01.
177.

Meghan

Gordon, Jefferson Opposes Adding Homes for Poor on West Bank,

TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 19, 2006, at B-3 [hereinafter Gordon, Jefferson Opposes]
(quoting Councilman Chris Roberts). Councilman Roberts reportedly clarified that he is
sympathetic to people who cannot work because of disabilities. Id
178. See H.R. 223, 2007th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2007); see also Meghan Gordon, Jefferson's
Housing Restrictions Attacked, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 17, 2007, at A-1
[hereinafter Gordon, Housing Restrictions].

179. For an exception to this quest, consider the Louisiana legislature's 2006 passage of the
Inclusionary Zoning and Workforce Affordable Housing Act, sponsored by Cheryl Gray, to allow
any municipality or parish with land-use and zoning ordinances or regulations to adopt ordinances
for "inclusionary zoning to increase the availability of affordable dwelling units within the
jurisdiction." 2006 La. Acts 2820 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:5001-5003 (2009));
see also H. Con. Res., 2007th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2007) (providing a model ordinance for
municipalities and parishes to use in providing for inclusionary zoning).

2011]

Government Housing and RacialSegregationPost-Katrina

689

automatically translate to Section 8 tenants, crime or other problems." 80
Although Hurricane Katrina displaced households of all incomes, races, and
ethnicities, census estimates indicated that 60% of those displaced in the New
Orleans metro area were black.'8 In Orleans Parish, an estimated 73% of the
population affected by the hurricane-or 272,000 people-were black. 182
Further, over one-half (52.8%) of those living in damaged areas were
renters.183 Thus, Hurricane Katrina displaced a substantial number of black
renters-enough to threaten the segregated-housing patterns that existed before
the storm. 184
Suburban jurisdictions sought to avoid the "do over" opportunity that the
storm presented, taking measures that reflected significant fear about the way
in which their pre-Katrina demographics might be altered in the rebuilding
effort. 185 For example, rather than merely banning new govemment-assisted
housing, some jurisdictions have taken the additional precaution of banning all
new rental housing.1 86 Further, some jurisdictions have not only blocked new
rental housing, but they have also taken steps to eliminate the rental housing
that pre-existed Hurricane Katrina.18 7
The racial impact of zoning bans against rental and government-assisted
housing that have proliferated in metropolitan New Orleans post-Katrina is
revealed through litigation challenging the zoning bans. 88 With respect to
bans on rental housing generally, black households in metropolitan New
Orleans are twice as likely as white households to live in rental units. 189
Furthermore, an ordinance that excludes housing programs serving low-income
180. Cohen, supra note 145 (reporting the comments of Wendell Dufour, the Director of
University of New Orleans's Division of Planning in the Center for Urban and Public Affairs).
181. Motion for Preliminary Injunction attach. 2, at 24, New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr.
v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009), ECF 6-2 [hereinafter Memo of Points
& Auth.].
182. THOMAS GABE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33141, HURRICANE KATRINA:
SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPACTED AREAS 16 (2005).
183. JOHN R. LOGAN, THE IMPACT OF KATRINA: RACE AND CLASS IN STORM-DAMAGED
NEIGHBORHOODS 7 tbl.2, availableat http://www.s4.brown.edulkatrina/report.pdf.
184. See Troutt, supra note 67, at 1143 (citing a Brookings Institution report and noting that
38 of 47 census tracts of "extreme poverty" as of 2000 were affected by the levee breaches of
Hurricane Katrina).
185. See infra Part V.B.1-4.
186. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F.
Supp. 2d 563, 566, 578 (E.D. La. 2009) (finding that an ordinance that "placed a moratorium on
the construction of all multi-family housing . .. for a period of twelve months or until the Council
enacted certain zoning updates" had a discriminatory effect on blacks and, as such, violated the
Fair Housing Act).
189. Bradford Declaration, supra note 108, at 3 ("51.70% of the [black] households within
the New Orleans Metropolitan Area are renters while only 25.03% of the white households are
renters.").
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households-such as the LIHTC program and subsidy programs operated by
HUD-excludes a disproportionate number of black households.1 9 0 The racial
disparities are augmented when families-households with at least two
persons-are considered.' 9' These disparities increase as income decreases.1 92
1. Terrytown

Terrytown, a small suburb of New Orleans that was created in 1960, is
located on the West Bank of Jefferson Parish.193 According to long-time
residents, many families moved to Terrytown from New Orleans because they
could not afford to buy a home in the city and because housing was more
affordable on the West Bank.194 These early residents searching for affordable
housing on the West Bank, many with subsidies, were largely whites who were
relocating from the Irish Channel neighborhood in New Orleans.' 9 5 By 2000,
however, Terrytown experienced a demographic shift, integrating to nearly
35% black,19 6 up from nearly 20% in 1990, only 5% in 1980,198 and 0.35%
in 1970.199 As of 2000, Jefferson Parish as a whole had a population that was
22.9% black.200
Following Katrina, elected representatives of Terrytown joined the chorus of
those opposing the use of recovery dollars to create replacement rental housing
in their communities. On October 18, 2006, a Jefferson Parish councilman
representing Terrytown sponsored a resolution expressing to agencies charged
with overseeing the housing recovery that Jefferson Parish objected to any
applications by developers to build apartment complexes or single-family

190.

Id at 3-4.

191.

Id. at 3.

192. Id. at 4. These impacts were calculated using 2007 American Community Survey data
compiled by the Census Bureau. Id at 5, 10.
193. See Allen Powell 11, West Bank Community Holds Party to Mark 50 Years of
Small-Town Living with Big-City Conveniences, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 5, 2010,
at A-1.
194. Id. (noting, also, that "[m]any of the original homeowners were veterans taking
advantage of the GI Bill").
195. Id In 1970, Gretna, which included Terrytown, was 75.5% white. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE

POPULATION OF LOUISIANA 39 tbl.16 (1973).
CENSUS
BUREAU,
DP-1 PROFILE
196. U.S.
CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 (Terrytown) (2000).
197.

OF

GENERAL

DEMOGRAPHIC

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DP-I GENERAL POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS:

1990 (Terrytown) (1990).
198.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION,

GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF LOUISIANA: 1980 tbl.14 (Terrytown) (1982).
199. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION,
GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF LOUISIANA: 1970 8 tbl. (Terrytown) (1971).
200.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DP-1 PROFILE OF GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 (Jefferson

Parish) (2000).
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homes in nearby Gretna or Terrytown using low-income tax credits.201
Council members unanimously approved this district-specific measure without
discussion. 202
This kind of blanket opposition to tax-credit housing uses the low incomes
of the residents as a proxy for the quality of the housing and the kind of
neighbors the residents will make, rather than other factors such as design
203
Even groups that would
details, maintenance plans, and tenant screening.
likely pose the least threat, such as the displaced elderly, were unwelcome.204
One of the applications pending at the time of the exclusionary resolution was
a 200-unit building proposed by Volunteers of America for residents over the
This project would have replaced 199 flooded units of
age of sixty-two. 2
elderly housing formerly in eastern New Orleans.206 After developers
succeeded in obtaining $6.29 million in tax credits from the state despite the
Parish's resolution, the Council imposed an eighteen-month land-use study that
halted development while the Parish considered changing the site's zoning
207
from multifamily to single-family residential2. This zoning change caused
the nonprofit developer to abandon the project, resulting in the project's return
to Orleans Parish, where it had been located prior to Katrina.20 8
In addition to blocking a new development, some Jefferson Parish officials
and constituents did not support the restoration of certain hurricane-damaged
apartment complexes and used the units' disrepair to oppose the creation of
new subsidized developments.209 One councilman's strategy was to allow
apartments to deteriorate to the point that demolition was the only option.2 In
2007, before the credit-market freeze, a Dallas developer expressed interest in
201.

Gordon, Jefferson Opposes, supra note 177, at B-3.

202.

Id.

203. Gordon, Housing Restrictions, supra note 178, at A-1.
204. See Meghan Gordon, Terrytown Residents Resist Low-Income Housing,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 2, 2006, at B-3 [hereinafter Gordon, Terrytown Residents
Resist] (describing resistance to the development of a senior-citizen group home).
205. Id.
206. Meghan Gordon, Nonprofit Drops Plan for Senior Housing, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans) (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/ibase/news7/117152645065700.xml&coll= I [hereinafter Gordon, Nonprofit Drops].
207. Meghan Gordon, Charity, Jeff Sued over Botched Sale, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New

Orleans), Feb. 22, 2007, at B-i; Gordon, Nonprofit Drops, supra note 206.
208. See Editorial,Signs ofRecovery, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 2, 2010, at B-4.
209. See, e.g., Gordon, Housing Restrictions, supra note 178, at A-1 (discussing the
perspectives of some city officials on subsidized developments and multifamily housing); Deon
Roberts, Land Shortage Stifles for Large Apartment Development in New Orleans, NEW
ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, May 15, 2006, at 7 [hereinafter Roberts, Land Shortage] (noting

Councilman Chris Roberts's statement: "I think we have our fair share of multifamily housing
already.").
210. Roberts, Blighted Apartment Rehab, supra note 145. Councilman Roberts is quoted as
saying, "If they fall into further disrepair, that's only better. That only furthers our ability to get
some of these rat holes torn down. I think it's all part of a strategic process." Id
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rehabilitating five existing complexes in various locations on the West Bank of
Jefferson, totaling 1118 units.21
However, one councilman remarked, "I
would prefer some of the multifamily housing units be removed and replaced
with green space or another form of housing." 2 12 It might appear
counterintuitive for a local government to squelch private investment that
could place damaged apartments back into commerce, especially when certain
officials acknowledged "the difficulty Jefferson businesses . . . [had] filling

jobs in the service sector and middle management." 2 13 But officials equated all
multifamily housing with concentrated poverty and crime, 214 used the blight of
hurricane-damaged apartments to oppose any new development, and focused
on reducing the stock of multifamily housing below pre-Katrina levels.215
Constituents have been equally, if not more, concerned about the prospect of
new affordable-housing options in their neighborhoods. 216 Concerns about
socioeconomic and racial changes in neighborhoods appear to be intertwined.
One prominent landowner in the district remarked, "I would say now we're
just getting a disproportionate share of the lower-income families than we had
before .... It's changing the whole complexion of the area." 217 A councilman
from the West Bank of Jefferson Parish claimed that the area had its "fair share
of multifamily housing already." 218 As of 2000, 47.1% of occupied units in

211. Id In May 2007, this developer was already engaged in a $5.6 million rehabilitation of
another such apartment complex, which was financed solely through private funds. Id
212. Id.
213. Gordon, Housing Restrictions, supra note 178, at A-1.
214. Roberts, Blighted Apartment Rehab, supra note 145 (reporting Councilman Roberts's
comment: "Our experience in Jefferson Parish clearly shows that clustered multifamily housing
for the most part has not been managed properly, usually leads to blight, has a tremendous effect
on school performance scores, crime and economic development."). Constituents are equally
sour: "We don't need any more apartments, period, in Terrytown of any kind." See Gordon,
Housing Restrictions, supra note 178 (reporting a comment of Hank Berchak, the president of the
Terrytown Civic Association).
215. See Roberts, Blighted Apartment Rehab, supra note 145 (reporting a comment of
Councilman Chris Roberts: "If I have my prerogative, any [apartment complexes] we can get our

hands on to tear down, we're going to. Especially the ones that are blighted and a nuisance.");
see also Roberts, Land Shortage, supra note 209, at 7 (discussing Roberts's interest in tearing
down roughly 1500 apartment units within three complexes because of high crime and the
landlord's failure to make repairs).
216.

See Gordon, Terrytown Residents Resist, supra note 204, at B-3 (reporting that an

"overflow crowd" of Terrytown residents rallied behind the efforts of Councilman Chris Roberts
to stop new low-income housing in his district and noting that members of the crowd were
"rolling their eyes and cackling" at a developer's responses regarding a senior-citizen housing
proposal).
217. Meghan Gordon, More Housing for Poor Opposed: Roberts Says Those from City
Unwelcome, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 19, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
18151507.
218. Roberts, Land Shortage, supra note 209.
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Terrytown were inhabited by renters, compared with 36.1% of occupied units
in Jefferson Parish.2 19
2. Kenner

Founded in 1855 and classified as a city in 1952, the City of
Kenner-located ten miles west of downtown New Orleans-is the oldest city
in Jefferson Parish.220 The City of Kenner projected a 2010 population of
66,652 based on U.S. Census estimates, down from 70,517 in 2000.221
Between 1990 and 2000, the black, Hispanic, and Asian population grew to
over 30%, from 29.9% to 38.9%.222 The city acknowledges that, given recent
trends, it is likely to become increasingly diverse: "Current trends suggest that
Kenner will become less populated, older, and more ethnically and racially
diverse over the next 15 to 20 years. What is likely is that the future
population will hover somewhere close to existing levels, but increase slightly
and continue to diversify." 223
In mid-2007, the city of Kenner sought a moratorium on the development of
new multifamily residential units, pending the completion of a land-use plan
Officials cited the "great impact"
by the University of New Orleans (UNO).
of multifamily development on "adjacent neighborhoods, public infrastructure,
traffic density, [and] the demand for public services" as justifications.225
Kenner's Mayor described multifamily residential housing as "the most
volatile and the most humanly-dense of residential land uses," thus justifying a
226
The
temporary halt in construction until a land-use plan could be prepared.
passage of the construction moratorium was delayed until April 3, 2008, when
the Kenner City Council unanimously approved a ban on the issuance of
219. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LOUISIANA: 2000, 2000 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING tbl. 11 (2002).
220. City of Kenner, Government, http://www.kenner.1a.us/section_2.asp (last visited Mar.
17, 2011); City of Kenner, Kenner Historical Time Line Highlights, http://www.kenner.1a.us/
section 2 9.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2011); see also BETSY SWANSON, HISTORIC JEFFERSON
PARISH: FROM SHORE TO SHORE 109 (1975) ("Following the Civil War, immigrants from
Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the islands of Sicily and Ustica, as well as a number of freed
Negroes, settled in the community [of Kenner]."); HENRY J. THOEDE, HISTORY OF JEFFERSON
PARISH AND ITS PEOPLE 117 (1976) ("The City of Kenner is the oldest in Jefferson Parrish.").
221. CITY OF KENNER ET AL., PATTERN FOR PROGRESS: CITY OF KENNER LAND USE PLAN
6, 8 (2008), availableat http://www.kenner.1a.us/images/planning/pl_pfp plan.pdf.
222. Id. at 7.
223. Id. at 16.
224. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Kenner, Moratorium Sought on
Multi-Family Units (May 18, 2007), available at http://www.kenner.1a.uslimages/pr0518072.pdf;
see also Mary Sparacello, Multifamily housing faces halt; Kenner awaits land-use plan,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 6, 2007, at B-I (noting that Kenner signed a $25,000
contract with UNO to conduct a post-Katrina update of a land use study begun in 2000 entitled
"Pattern for Progress").
225. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, supra note 224.
226. Id.
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permits for the construction of developments with five or more apartments,
citing "an abundance of multi-family property in the City of Kenner." 227
Citizens likely supported this measure; as noted by one Kenner City
Councilman, "this [multifamily housing] is something that our citizens have
As might be expected, several
spoken out very strongly against."2
developments were in the planning stages at the time the Kenner City Council
Yet, the Kenner City Council insisted
proposed and passed the moratorium.
that the ban was not targeted at particular properties.230
The ban on new multifamily housing had the potential to eliminate rental
units in Kenner that existed before Hurricane Katrina. In particular, before the
storm, the Redwood Apartment complex in North Kenner consisted of 400
units and housed many low-income renters. 23 1 Despite the fact that this
demolished development existed prior to Katrina, homeowners adjacent to the
site approached the complex's redevelopment as if a change in the land's
permissible use was being proposed.2 32 Neighbors expressed concern about
noise, traffic, safety, and inadequate infrastructure and sought a multifamily
233
Thus, the Kenner
construction ban that would keep the site vacant.
to reduce the
multifamily-housing moratorium adopted post-Katrina threatened
234
number of rental units that were available before the storm.

227. Kenner, La., Ordinance No. 9662 (Apr. 3, 2008); see also Cohen, supra note 145
(discussing "[a] recently instated one-year moratorium on the construction of developments with
five or more apartments").
228.

Mary Sparacello, Multifamily Construction Ban OK'd, TIMES-PICAYUNE

(New

Orleans), Apr. 4, 2008, at B-1.
229. Cohen, supra note 145 (referring to concerns of investors that "[t]he ban already puts in
limbo at least two developments in planning stages and threatens investment in future
mixed-income projects").
230. Sparacello, supra note 228, at B-1 (reporting that Councilwoman Michele Branigan
stated that the moratorium "is something that everybody in the city is concerned about, and it's
not particular to one piece of property"). But see Cohen, supra note 145 (referring to comments
of Kenner City Councilman Joe Stagni that "[t]he law is a response to [neighborhood]
opposition" to the redevelopment of the Redwood Apartment complex specifically).
231. Cohen, supra note 145.
232. Id.
233. Id. When Kenner officials delayed the blanket ban on multifamily construction in June
2007, they opted instead to conduct "a study" of the 15 acres of vacant land that included the
Redwood apartments. See Sparacello, supra note 228, at B-1. UNO conducted the study and
recommended in early 2008 that the site be used for both residential and commercial
development. Id.
234. As one constituent put it: "[tihe less apartments, the better." Cohen, supra note 145.
But see Sparacello, supra note 228, at B-1 (noting that developments receiving approval prior to
the ban's passage would proceed, including a complex in south Kenner that was in the process of
being rebuilt).
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Despite the Council's protestations that "an abundance" of rental housing
existed in Kenner, 235 it was not necessarily affordable to its residents. In
March 2008, less than a month before the multifamily-housing ban, thousands
of people were reported to have lined up outside of the Kenner
housing-authority office to apply for federal rental-assistance vouchers. 236 The
question then became: did the City of Kenner pursue the multifamily housing
ban despite the demonstrated need of its residents, 237 or did the "thousands" of
needy residents create concern on the part of Kenner officials that action
needed to be taken to prevent the influx of federal subsidies into the city? 2 38
In 2000, renter-occupied housing comprised 39.2% of all occupied housing
in Kenner, a figure slightly above the rate for Jefferson Parish as a whole, but
nowhere near the proportion for Orleans Parish. 239 Also, this proportion of
renter-occupied housing in Kenner decreased from 41% in 1990.24' Although
a study conducted by UNO ultimately found no shortage of multifamily
housing within Kenner for existing residents, it did not recommend a
complete ban.241 Rather, the study recommended "high-density residential
development" in parts of the city as well as mixed-use residential development
on the Redwood Apartment complex site2.242 Further, the conclusion that there
is no shortage of multifamily housing, which would warrant new construction,
does not necessarily support a reduction in rental units.

235. See Cohen, supra note 145 (noting the comments of Councilman Joe Stagni and
explaining that the UNO study of the site of the Redwood Apartment complex found "no shortage
of multifamily housing in Kenner").
236. Id
237. Id. (reporting comments of the commissioner of the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency,
Mark Madderra, who stated, "There is clearly a significant demand for affordable housing in
Kenner as evidenced by the long line of people who showed up to apply for affordable housing,
and it concerns me that the government hasn't recognized that need").
238. See supra text accompanying note 225 (discussing Kenner officials' stated reasons for
the ban).
239. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QT-H2 TENURE, HOUSEHOLD SIZE, AND AGE OF
HOUSEHOLDER: 2000 (KENNER CITY, LOUISIANA) (2000) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
QT-H2 (KENNER CITY, LOUISIANA)]. Kenner reports that its dominant residential land-use is
single-family residential, comprising 16,639 units or 83.4% of all residential units. CITY OF
KENNER ET AL., supra note 221, at 10 tbl.4. Two-, three-, and four-unit buildings comprise 4285
units, or a total of 8.36% of all residential units. Id. Multifamily structures, consisting of more
than four units, comprise a total of 6043 units, or 8.03% of all residential units. Id.
240. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QT-H2 (KENNER CITY, LOUISIANA), supranote 239.
241. See Cohen, supra note 145.
242. Id. At least one developer thought it odd that the moratorium would be placed on
housing, rather than commercial development, given that the population has remained flat since
the 1980s: "That's what the city of Kenner needs-it needs housing." Sparacello, supra note 228,
at B-I (reporting the comments of developer Henry Shane).
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3. Saint BernardParish

Saint Bernard Parish is located five miles east of downtown New Orleans
and was founded in 1807.243 In 2000, the Saint Bernard Parish population
consisted of 7.6% black persons and 88.3% white persons.244 A thirty-foot
tidal surge spawned by Hurricane Katrina damaged or destroyed all of the
26,000 homes in Saint Bernard Parish.245 As of August 2008, 37,000 people
had returned, representing only slightly more than one-half of the pre-Katrina
population of 68,000.246 In late 2008, Saint Bernard Parish's President invited
the public to Saint Bernard Parish, making this pitch: "Displaced residents,
visitors, and new residents are all welcomed to share in what has long been one
,,247
of Louisiana's best kept secrets.
Despite the stated interest of the Parish in
regrowing its population and rebuilding its housing stock and infrastructure,
Saint Bernard Parish issued a number of restrictive-zoning ordinances that
seem to undermine these goals.
In November 2005, during the immediate aftermath of the storm, the parish
passed an ordinance establishing "a moratorium on the re-establishment and
development of any multifamily dwellings in Saint Bernard Parish throughout
the disaster recovery period."2 8 The moratorium was designed so that only
existing multifamily units were considered for redevelopment, and only if the
Council's concerns were met with respect to "placement irregularities, over
density problems and quality of life issues." 249 High density within the parish
was considered more than "two eight-plex structures in a one block radius."250
After Katrina, other communities passed bans on rental housing, but Saint
Bernard Parish took a more creative approach. On September 19, 2006, the
Parish passed its infamous blood-relative ordinance. 251 This ordinance
243. Letter from Craig P. Taffaro, Jr., St. Bernard Parish President, in KATRINA: THREE
YEARS LATER, HURRICANE RECOVERY PROGRESS REPORT FOR ST. BERNARD PARISH,
LOUISIANA 8 (2008), available at http://www.sbpg.net/images/stories/sbpg3yr.pdf, ST. BERNARD
PARISH NET, History, http://stbernardparish.net/history.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2011).
244. Bradford Declaration, supra note 108, at 7.
245. KATRINA: THREE YEARS LATER, HURRICANE RECOVERY PROGRESS REPORT FOR ST.
BERNARD PARISH, LOUISIANA, supra note 243, at 2.
246. Id.
247. Letter from Craig P. Taffaro, Jr., supra note 243 (emphasis added).
248. Saint Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance SBPC #632-11-05 (Nov. 1, 2005).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Saint Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance SBPC #670-09-06 (Sept. 19, 2006). The Saint
Bernard Parish Council (SBPC) previously passed two ordinances restricting the rental of
single-family homes. On March 7, 2006, the SBPC passed a measure that placed a moratorium
on the rental of single-family homes "until such time as the post Katrina real estate market in St.
Bernard Parish stabilizes." Saint Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance SBPC #643-03-06 § I (Mar. 7,
2006). The stated purpose of the ordinance was "to preserve the integrity of single family
Saint Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance SBPC #643-03-06.
dwelling neighborhoods."
Subsequently, on July 6, 2006, the SBPC enacted an ordinance that required "[t]hat all single
family dwellings to be used as rental property [obtain] a Conditional Use permit issued from the
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prohibited the rental of single-family residences "by any person or group of
persons, other than a family member(s) related by blood within the first,
second or third direct ascending or descending generation(s), without first
obtaining a Permissive Use Permit from the Saint Bernard Parish Council." 252
The ordinance went so far as to prohibit the "occupancy or use" of the
single-family dwelling by anyone other than a blood relative.253 The stated
purpose of the ordinance was to encourage owners of single-family residences
to return, rebuild their homes, and resume living in the parish, as well as "to
maintain the integrity and stability of established neighborhoods as centers of
family values and activities."254 Violators, including both lessors and lessees,
were subject to criminal and civil penalties consisting, in part, of various fines
imposed for each day that the property was rented in violation of the
ordinance.255 Single-family property owners who were renting homes when
the blood-relative ordinance passed were exempted from its coverage. 256By
restricting rentals in this way, the parish allowed rentals to "insiders," such as
blood relatives of existing residents, but denied rentals to "outsiders." 257
The Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center (GNOFHAC) and a
single-family homeowner challenged the blood-relative ordinance, alleging
that the ordinance "was passed with the intent and has the effect of denying
and otherwise making unavailable rental housing to non-white persons."
GNOFHAC also alleged that the blood relative ordinance, as part of a series of
ordinances restricting the rental of single-family homes in Saint Bernard
Parish, "perpetuates segregation by preserving the Parish as an
overwhelmingly all-white enclave."259 GNOFHAC also challenged the 2005
multifamily-housing moratorium on the same grounds, alleging intentional
discrimination and arguing that the moratorium had the "effect of denying and
making unavailable rental housing disproportionately needed by black and
Hispanic persons." 260
GNOFHAC cited evidence that the parish council's purpose in passing the
blood-relative ordinance was to maintain the racial homogeneity of the parish.
Contemporaneous statements, such as a comment of one Councilman that
Office of Community Development." Saint Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance SBPC #661-07-06 §
1 (July 6, 2006).
252. Saint Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance SBPC #670-09-06 § LA. (Sept. 19, 2006).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. §§ I(F), I(I).
256. Id. § I(K).
257. See Troutt, supra note 67, at 1146 ("Suburban legal power is sometimes a tool, but more
often a shield used to defend against outsiders.").
258. Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Remedial Relief
para. 3, at 2, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563
(E.D. La. 2009) (Civ. Action No. 2:06-CV-07185) [hereinafter Amended Complaint].
259. Id.
260. Id para. 4, at 2-3.
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"[a]ll we're doing is saying we want to maintain the demographics," suggest
this purpose.261 Council chair Lynn Dean, who voted against the ordinance,
put it more bluntly, stating that the ordinance was passed to "block the blacks
from living in these areas."262 The demographics are revealing. As of 2000,
white families, who made up 88.3% of Saint Bernard's population, owned
93.2% of all owner-occupied houses in the parish.263 Thus, regardless of the
intent behind the blood-relative ordinance, its practical effect was to make
single-family rentals unavailable to nonwhite persons. Further, GNOFHAC
alleged that all of the Saint Bernard Parish ordinances were designed to make
rental housing, which is disproportionately needed by blacks and Hispanics in
the New Orleans metropolitan area, unavailable in Saint Bernard Parish.264
The parish sought to justify the blood-relative ordinance by claiming that it
was necessary to preserve the parish's history of mostly owner-occupied
neighborhoods.265 GNOFHAC countered that the justification lacked any
rational relationship to the actual effect of the ordinance, which was to
"permit[] some rentals to a virtually all-white class of persons while denying
rentals to virtually all minorities." 266
The parties resolved the litigation challenging single- and multifamily-rental
restrictions through a consent decree, which the district court signed in
February 2008.267 The consent decree granted the court continuing jurisdiction
for a three-year period.268 The parish agreed to drop the blood-relative
ordinance and substitute an alternative procedure for approving certain rental
transactions in the parish. 269 The parish also agreed to refrain from future
270
discrimination on the basis of race or national origin.

261. Memo of Points & Auth., supra note 181, at 13. Another councilman stated, "We don't
want to change the aesthetics of a neighborhood." Id. (citing Michelle Chen, Housing Watchdogs
Call Post-Katrina Ordinance "Racist," THE NEW STANDARD, Oct. 6, 2006).

Still another

councilman who voted against the ordinance acknowledged that the fear of greater racial
integration could be the driving force behind community support for the ordinance. Id.
262. Memo of Points & Auth., supranote 181, at 14 (quoting Chen, supra note 261).
263. Motion for Preliminary Injunction attach. 3, at 5-6, New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr.
v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009) (Civ. Action No. 2:06-CV-07185),
ECF No. 6-3.
264. Amended Complaint, supra note 258, para. 14, at 5.
265. Id. para. 19, at 7.
266. Id. para. 21, at 8.
267. Consent Order at 5-8, 11, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard
Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2008) (Civ. Action No. 2:06-CV-07185).
268. Id. at 8. The parish had previously agreed through a stipulation entered in November
2006 to refrain from enforcing the blood-relative ordinance. Joint Stipulation at 1-2, Greater
New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009)
(Civ. Action No. 06-7185). The parish rescinded the blood-relative ordinance in January 2007.
Consent Order, supra note 267, at 4.
269. Consent Order, supra note 267, at 7.
270. Id at 6-7.
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Despite the consent decree issued earlier in the year, in September 2008, the
parish resuscitated its multifamily-housing ban, placing a moratorium on "any
housing developments with five (5) or more units" for as long as twelve
months.271 The ban prompted GNOFHAC and a housing developer to file a
motion to enforce the consent decree.272 The Dallas-based developer,
Provident Realty Advisors, Inc., met with parish government officials about its
proposed seventy-two-unit developmentS273 and received preliminary
assurances that the properties were properly zoned.274 However, in response to
public outcry incited by a newspaper editorial, the parish government withdrew
its support for the developments and imposed the moratorium.275 Although the
parish claimed that a development moratorium was an accepted planning
practice for a jurisdiction engaged in a comprehensive planning and zoning
study, it did not ban commercial development or other residential development
during that time. 276 Significantly, as noted by the court, "the type of housing
restricted or forbidden is disproportionately utilized by African Americans." 27
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the September
2008 multifamily-housing ban violated the Fair Housing Act as well as the
February 2008 consent order.278 Specifically, the court held that the
multifamily-housing ban was adopted with discriminatory intent and had a
racially discriminatory impact.279 The court later found Saint Bernard Parish
in contempt for violating the February 2008 consent order. 280
Even after a federal judge found that Saint Bernard Parish engaged in
intentional race discrimination by enacting its multifamily-housing ban, the
parish and its residents continued to wage a public-relations war against
multifamily housing. The parish held a series of public hearings on the four

271. St. Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance SBPC #905-09-08 § I (Sept. 16, 2008).
272. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Enforce Consent
Decree at 2, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d
563 (E.D. La. 2009) (Civ. Action No. 2:06-CV-07185).
273. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563,
566, 570 (E.D. La. 2009). The Provident development proposed for Saint Bernard Parish consists
of four mixed-income rental-apartment complexes of seventy-two units each. Id at 566. Thirty
percent of the units would rent at fair-market rates, 50% would be rented to those at 60% of Area
Median Income (AMI), and 20% would be rented to those at 30% of AMI. Id.
274. Id. at 570.
275. Id. at 572-73.
276. Opinion Regarding Multifamily Fair Housing Discrimination Claim for St. Bernard
Parish Government at 8, 10, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish,
641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009) (Civ. Action No. 2:06-CV-07185).
277.

Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., 641 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (crediting the

testimony of the plaintiff s expert, Dr. Calvin Bradford).
278. Id. at 565, 569, 577-78.
279. Id.
280. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, No. 2:06-CV-07158,
2009 WL 2177241, at * 1 (E.D. La. July 22, 2009).
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proposed seventy-two-unit developments.281 Along with ongoing concerns
about ghetto living, gang banging, drug dealing, and drive-by shootings, 282 the
opposition increasingly emphasized that there was a sufficient supply of
affordable rental-housing, and that allowing low-income tax-credit housing to
be built in the parish would result in an over-supply of such housing and a
decline in property values. 283 The parish asked the state agency that awarded
the low-income housing tax credits, which were vital to the developments, to
withdraw the award.284
In addition to scheduling public hearings about the development, Saint
Bernard Parish engaged in a variety of overt and covert measures designed to
block the developments, causing the district court to enter two subsequent
contempt orders. The parish denied the developer's application to re-subdivide
the plats for the development, prompting the developer to file a motion seeking
to hold the parish in contempt of the court's prior orders. 285 In August 2009,
after an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the requested motion and
required the parish to consider the re-subdivision applications at the next
286
planning-commission hearing.
Eight days later, the parish persisted in its refusal to re-subdivide the plats
and the planning commission essentially refused to consider the court's August
2009 order, stating that "the Judge doesn't say what's a major or a minor

281. Chris Kirkham, Housing Debate in St. Bernard Reflects Post-Katrina Landscape,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 19, 2009, at A-I [hereinafter Kirkham, Housing Debate].

The meetings are described as follows:
For nearly three months, the meetings about the mixed-income apartment complexes
slated for Chalmette have drawn standing-room-only crowds to the St. Bernard Parish
government complex. A steady stream of speakers walk up to the microphone, each
voicing unbending opposition to the complexes they say will send the parish's real
estate market into a tailspin ....
Id.
282. GreaterNew Orleans FairHous. Action Ctr., 2009 WL 2969502, at *4.
283. Kirkham, Housing Debate, supra note 281, at A-I; see also, Chris Kirkham, Housing
Ban Lands Parish in Court Again, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 28, 2008, at B-I

(reporting Councilman Wayne J. Landry as saying, "It's going to create the density of rental
spaces too close, which is exactly the opposite of what the rental ordinance is trying to do. We
didn't want to have that concentrated density, and now we're going to go and put 280 units in
four locations?").
284.

Kirkham, Housing Debate, supra note 281, at A-1.

285. Motion for Contempt at 1, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard
Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009) (Civ. Action No. 2:06-cv-07185).
286. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 648 F. Supp. 2d 805,
821 (E.D. La. 2009). In a detailed opinion finding the parish in contempt, the court noted that,
although the planning-commission staff had initially recommended approval of the plan to
re-subdivide the plats as a minor subdivision, the planning commission abruptly recast the
application as one for a major re-subdivision, was influenced by a racially charged public hearing,
and engaged in procedural delays and referrals between the parish council and planning
commission. Id at 810-13.
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subdivision in St. Bernard Parish. ,,287 The developer filed another motion for
contempt. 288 Following an evidentiary hearing, the court partially granted the
motion.2 89 It deemed the re-subdivision applications approved and set
deadlines for other building permit-related decisions, communications, and
approvals on parking, landscaping, drainage, and fire. 290 In its third finding of
contempt, the court noted, "Defendants may disagree with this Court's prior
orders, but under our system of laws, they must abide by those prior orders
unless and until the Court of Appeals takes a different view. Defendants are
not free to defy this Court simply because they think they know better." 29 1
Regarding the parish's dilatory efforts, the court stated, "This Court has
repeatedly found the stated justifications given by these officials to be
unsound, contrived, pretextual and racially discriminatory." 292 As this Article
goes to print, despite the filing of two additional contempt motions and a
motion for a temporary restraining order,293 it appears that construction has

287. Motion for Contempt, Injunctive Relief, and Sanctions at 1, Greater New Orleans Fair
Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, No. 2:06-cv-07185, 2009 WL 2969502 (E.D. La. Sept.
11,2009).
288. Id
289. GreaterNew Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., 2009 WL 2969502, at * 1.
290. Id at *4-7.
291. Id at *2.
292. Id at *4.
293. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Greater New Orleans Fair
Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, No. 2:06-CV-07185 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2011). Plaintiffs
filed a fourth motion for contempt over the September 15, 2009 passage of an additional
ordinance that, if passed by voters, would ban all multifamily housing developments with more
than six units. Plaintiff GNOFHAC's Motion for Contempt at 1, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous.
Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, No. 2:06-CV-07185 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2009); Chris Kirkman,
St. Bernard Backtracking on Apartments, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 22, 2009, at
A-1. Before the court could decide that motion, the parish rescinded the ordinance, purportedly
under pressure from the federal government related to the parish's continued receipt of
community development block grant funding. Defendant's Notice to Court at 1, Greater New
Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, No. 2:06-CV-07185 (E.D. La. Nov. 4,
2009). The plaintiffs filed a fifth contempt motion in January 2011 based on the failure of the
parish to renew building permits for the development because of zoning changes that would
prohibit the proposed multifamily housing. Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt at 1, Greater New
Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, No. 2:06-CV-07185 (E.D. La. Jan. 14,
2010); see also Benjamin Alexander-Bloch, St. Bernard Parish Approves Mixed-Income
Development, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Feb. 7, 2011, 2:04 PM), http://blog.nola.com/
politics/print.html?entry=/2011/02/st bernardparish approvesmix.html (noting that this was
"the fifth contempt of court motion filed against the parish"). Again, HUD intervened, filing its
own fair-housing complaint, which "jeopardize[d] about $91 million in federal funding already
committed to parish projects." Alexander-Bloch, supra. HUD began an investigation into the
parish's amended zoning ordinance "that eliminated multifamily housing as a permitted use in
five zoning areas where it previously was allowed." Id. Again the parish relented, agreeing to
allow the project to go forward. Id. ("Parish councilmen said in order not to jeopardize the $91
million they would have to let the development go forward and work with HUD on its broader
zoning concerns.").
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finally proceeded on the developer's multifamily-housing development in
Saint Bernard Parish.294 Citing ongoing harassment and interferences,
however, the court has retained jurisdiction of the matter until the end of

2011.295
As of 2000, about 25% of all occupied units in Saint Bernard Parish were
renter-occupied, which is half the amount of rental units that existed in
neighboring Orleans Parish.296 The barriers to entry erected by the Saint
Bernard Parish Council were likely not designed merely to preserve the racial
and socioeconomic homogeneity that pre-existed Katrina, but also to reduce
the relatively low number of ethnic minorities in the parish. Before Katrina,
the black population was heavily concentrated in a neighborhood called
Village Square.297 Village Square is a neighborhood within Saint Bernard
Parish that was considered blighted prior to Hurricane Katrina.298 This
five-block area of approximately 700 apartments started out as rental housing
for working-class families in the 1970s, but when a local plant closed in the
early 1980s, demand decreased, the apartments fell into disrepair, and the area
became associated with crime and drug activity.299 In 2004, the U.S.
Department of Justice filed a federal fair-housing action based on its own
investigation of 120 apartments, alleging that property owners steered blacks
toward and whites away from the Village Square neighborhood on the basis of
race. 300
The fact that the parish acted within three months of Katrina to prevent the
redevelopment of multifamily housing in Saint Bernard Parish prevented
Village Square residents from returning to Village Square and, thus, to the
parish. GNOFHAC alleged that, although Saint Bernard Parish officials issued
permits for the redevelopment of existing multifamily units in other areas of
the parish, they did not issue permits for the redevelopment of any multifamily

294.

See Monica Hernandez, St. Bernard Neighbors Say New Construction is Destroying

Wetlands, WWLTV.COM (Feb. 18, 2011) ("After two years of heated protests against
mixed-income apartments, St. Bernard Parish issued a building permit this month for the four
complexes.").
295. See Order and Reasons at 4, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard
Parish, No. 2:06-cv-07185 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Order and Reasons] (modifying
the consent decree to retain jurisdiction until the end of 2011, citing Saint Bernard Parish's efforts
to "derail" construction of multifamily housing in the parish).
296. See supra note 165.
297. Memo of Points & Auth., supra note 181, at 4.
298. Richard Slawsky, St. Bernard Parish Housing Authority Would Work to Clean up
Slums, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUsINESS, June 20, 2005, at 13; see also Memo of Points & Auth.,
supra note 181, at 6 (reporting that the parish council created a committee in February 2005 "to
explore ways to expropriate Village Square, bulldoze the buildings, and expel residents").
299. Slawsky, supra note 298, at 13.
300. See Memo of Points & Auth., supra note 181, at 4 & n.1.
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units in Village Square.301 In September 2006, the parish formally designated
Village Square as a mitigation area, which would result in it being converted to
green space.302 Further, the 2006 Saint Bernard Parish ordinances restricting
rentals of single-family dwellings would have prevented Village Square
residents from rentinp single-family homes as an alternative to multifamily
housing in the parish. 03 It is difficult to imagine a more effective strategy for
preventing the return of blacks who rented housing in Saint Bernard Parish
pre-Katrina and ensuring that no new black renters would be able to migrate
there.
Indeed, the fact that the Village Square site is designated as a low-income
census tract paved the way for the parish to obtain $6 million in
304
community development block grant money for redevelopment purposes.
The availability of federal money to counteract blight in Village Square creates
an ironic scenario in which the parish may use the low incomes of former
residents to obtain federal dollars for redevelopment activity as it
simultaneously takes extraordinary measures to close off all points of reentry
to its former low-income black residents.
To the extent that Saint Bernard Parish is considered the next rung on the
"housing ladder" for low-income blacks looking for less-segregated housing
conditions and neighborhoods in which to raise their families because of
affordable, median housing prices,30s it is troubling that the parish-clearly
301. Amended Complaint, supra note 258, paras. 27-33, at 9-11; see also id. para. 35, at 12
(stating that the parish council denied the plaintiffs-Wallace Rodrigue's- formal application to
renovate his own property in September 2006-nine months after he submitted his
application-citing the moratorium and the parish's plans to "mitigate" the Village Square area);
Memo of Points & Auth., supra note 181, at 14-15 (discussing evidence that race of
neighborhood residents prior to the storm influenced decisions on permit applications for
multifamily housing).
302. Amended Complaint, supra note 258, para. 32, at 11. Given that the mitigation
program's purpose is to limit the redevelopment of flood-prone areas, it is notable that the most
flood-prone areas of Saint Bernard were located outside of Village Square in predominantly white
neighborhoods. Memo of Points & Auth., supra note 181, at 15.
303. See supra notes 248-56 and accompanying text.
304.

Chris Kirkham, St. Bernard is Back to Square One on Complex, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New

Orleans), May 25, 2009, at A-I ("Because the area is designated as a low-income census tract, a
$58 million hospital investment in the area could generate more than $6 million in additional
revenue to use for construction of a medical office building on the site .... ). Various plans have
been proposed for the use of the $6 million in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
money made available because of the low incomes of displaced Village Square residents. See id.
In addition to the hospital plan, the parish also negotiated with a private developer who would
purchase individual tracts within Village Square from property owners; the parish would use
hazard-mitigation funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and CDBG funds to
assist with acquisition costs for use of the land as green space. Id.
305. See Expert Report at 9, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard
Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009) (Civ. Action No. 2:06-CV-07185) (reporting that
redevelopment planners in Saint Bernard Parish post-Katrina were worried about keeping housing
affordable).
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eager to grow its population-is directing so much energy toward denying
entry to those in arguably the same circumstances as those entering the parish
decades ago. Indeed, between 1960 and the 1980s, whites who had occupied
legally segregated housing projects sought to escape desegregation in favor of
"affordable-living alternatives in working-class suburbs" such as Saint Bernard
Parish.o 6 These white families, in search of "better school districts, safety,
suburban life-styles, less congestion, and lower costs of living" 307 were
permitted to use their housing mobility to improve the socioeconomic position
of their families and, thus, future generations. 30 It is unlikely that these white
individuals, some of them former public-housing residents, faced the same
kind of mobility barriers that black public-housing residents experienced in the
post-Katrina period.309
4. New Orleans East

New Orleans East is an Orleans Parish suburb that has experienced
substantial racial and demographic shifts since 1980.310 Most of the
neighborhoods within New Orleans East were developed in the 1960s and
1970s. 311'31At that time, the area was occupied mostly by whites.312 In the
1980s, the Oil Bust severely reduced demand for apartment units in the area,
which paved the way for lower-income families to move into previously
middle-class apartment complexes.313 The increasing number of low-income
families, most of them black, moving into the area sparked a massive white
exodus in the late 1980s and early 1990s.314 By 2005, New Orleans East was a
predominantly black suburb, 315 with some exclusive neighborhoods occupied
by upper-income black families. 316 At the time of this writing, New Orleans
306.

Richard Campanella, An Ethnic Geography of New Orleans, 94 J. AM. HIST. 704, 710

(2007). Saint Bernard Parish also welcomed whites from the bordering New Orleans ninth ward
neighborhood who wished to escape school desegregation in the 1960s. See Katy Reckdahl, Fifty
Years Later, Students Recall Integrating New Orleans Public Schools, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New

Orleans) (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/l l/fiftyyears_later_
studentsrec.html (describing the efforts of Saint Bernard Parish segregationist leader, Leander
Perez, to recruit white New Orleans parents to send their children to all-white Saint Bernard
Parish schools in the early 1960s).
307. Campanella, supra note 306, at 710.
308. Id. at 709-10.
309. See Mahoney, supra note 15, at 1282-83 ("White mobility brought gradual racial
transition in the projects as whites stopped moving in; however, this means that the racial
transition was at least strongly affected by greater white opportunity within the private market.").
310. See Campanella,supra note 306, at 710.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See id.; Fussell, supra note 15, at 851 (discussing the Oil Bust).
314. See Campanella,supra note 306, at 710.
315. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2005-2009 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 5-YEAR
ESTIMATES (ORLEANS PARISH, LOUISIANA) (listing the racial composition of Orleans Parish).

316.

LOGAN, supra note 183, at 13.

2011]

Government Housing and Racial Segregation Post-Katrina

705

East has failed to reopen its hospital or regain significant commercial and retail
services.317
Prior to Katrina, residents in New Orleans East organized to oppose the
development of new affordable apartments in the area, arguing that they had
more than their fair share of such housing. 318 It was perhaps not surprising that
proposals for affordable housing after Katrina sparked the same kind of
opposition.319 For example, residents opposed the development of thirty-eight
single-family homes designed to provide affordable "work force" housing
under a lease-purchase arrangement near the upscale Lake Carmel
subdivision.320 Residents also opposed a multifamily complex near the gated
community of Eastover.32 1 Pursuant to state legislation enacted in 2008, the
Eastern New Orleans Neighborhood Advisory Commission, "a board
comprising representatives of various homeowners associations," is allowed
"30 days to review projects in the area before the city makes zoning changes or
issue[s] building permits." 322
5. Consequences ofExclusionaryZoning: Tax-Credit Market Freeze

Given that a significant portion of hurricane-recovery assistance has come in
the form of LIHTC housing,323 local officials' rejection of this assistance has
certainly obstructed hurricane recovery in metro New Orleans.324 The fact that
317.

Bruce Nolan, Mystery of the East, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 12, 2010, at

A-1.

318.

David Hammer, Homeowners, Legislators Battle Eastern New Orleans Apartments,

TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Jan. 22, 2009, 10:33 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/index
.ssf/2009/01/homeowners legislatorsbattle.html; see Elie, supra note 64, at A-9 (describing a
perceived "overabundance of apartment complexes" and a reported "800 units of Section 8
housing" in eastern New Orleans).
319.

See Bruce Eggler, Housing Proposal Opposed, Blocked, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New

Orleans), Mar. 26, 2009, at B-1.
320. Id. ("[R]esidents [are] fearful the development would threaten their property values and
quality of life.").
321. See Elie, supra note 64, at A-1.
322.

David Hammer, Apartment Plans for East N.O. Opposed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New

Orleans), Jan. 23, 2009, at A-1.
323.

See BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 154, at 3 (noting that

low-income housing tax credits are among the three types of financial assistance Congress
provided to address rental housing issues); Gordon, Terrytown Residents Resist, supra note 204,
at B-3 ("As part of the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act, Congress approved giving $57 million
annually for three years in tax credits to private businesses who restock Louisiana's
hurricane-ravaged housing supply.").
324. See Order and Reasons, supra note 295, at 4 (finding that the harassment and
interference of Saint Bernard Parish with respect to the construction of affordable housing "has
placed [the developer] at risk of losing the federal tax credits that finance its construction
project."). For example, Mark Madderra, the chairman of the Louisiana Housing Finance
Agency's multifamily-housing committee, remarked that "the actions [of Jefferson Parish
Councilman Chris Roberts] block the only major program Congress has made available to restore
the region's multifamily housing." Gordon, Housing Restrictions, supra note 178, at A-1. Also,
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the bottom dropped out of the tax-credit market during the economic downturn
of fall 2008 also jeopardized the use of tax credits that had not yet been placed
in service. 325 Local governments in metro New Orleans cannot be blamed for
the tax-credit market freeze, but the delays occasioned by their rejection of
tax-credit projects likely compounded its negative impact.326 It is certainly
true that the availability of land has also limited where new multifamily
housing can be developed in metropolitan New Orleans. 327 But, despite
geographic limitations on growth, there was no shortage of interest prior to the
tax-credit market freeze among out-of-state developers with regard to applying
for federal tax credits to finance the development of multifamily housing in the
area. 328
6. Highest OpportunityNeighborhoodsin the Region: Open and
Affordable?

Despite the region's challenges in attempting to recover from Hurricane
Katrina, two metropolitan New Orleans area locales have recently managed to
make a "top 100" list of best places to live in the United States. 3 29
RelocateAmerica, an online-marketing service for real-estate professionals,
conducts an annual review of data concerning education, economy, local
leadership, parks, recreation, and housing. 330 It also considers nominations
from residents and local businesses.33 In 2009, RelocateAmerica selected
Metairie, in Jefferson Parish, and Mandeville,332 in Saint Tammany Parish, as
Ernest Johnson, president of the Louisiana NAACP, reportedly "sees [exclusionary actions in
Terrytown] as a deliberate barrier to affordable housing that will choke the region's housing
recovery when Jefferson is otherwise well-situated to step in for more devastated areas." Id.
325.

See BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 154 (explaining that a weak

economy negatively affects tax-credit developments); ROSE ET AL., supra note 161, at 6 ("The
national economic downturn means fewer investors in Low Income Housing Tax Credits,
jeopardizing the financing for as many as 4,600 of the planned 13,100 units of multifamily rental
housing in southern Louisiana.").
326.

See supra text accompanying notes 201, 281-84; see also ROSE ET AL., supra note 161,

at 7 (noting the detrimental effects of "changing rules and arbitrary practices").
327. Roberts, Land Shortage, supra note 209, at 7 ("Despite Katrina's widespread
destruction, there is scant land in or near New Orleans to build large apartment complexes.").
328. Id ("M[etairie apartment] broker Larry Schedler answers 15 to 20 calls every day, most
from out-of-towners interested in buying land in New Orleans where they can build large
apartment complexes.").
329.

See Relocate-America's 2009

Top

100

Places to Live,

RELOCATEAMERICA,

http://www.relocateamerica.com/top-I00-cities/2009/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2011).
330.

About RelocateAmerica, RELOCATEAMERICA, http://www.relocateamerica.com/about/

(last visited Mar. 17, 2011).
331. Id.
332. According to Mandeville's marketing material posted on the RelocateAmerica website,
the city
enjoys a lifestyle that is quite different from New Orleans, its South Shore
neighbor. . . . Mandeville residents have a common goal: to work hard, and support
their families to the best of their ability. Our unemployment rate is extremely low, and
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among the "top 100 places to live" in the nation. 3 33 Most interesting about
these selections is that these are not communities that have implemented
sweeping housing moratoria post-Katrina relating to multifamily or rental
housing.-3 The question arises: why are the communities that have been
designated among the highest-opportunity communities in the region not slated
for any affordable-housing development?335
As if to make the fair-housing argument while also highlighting the impact
of exclusionary land-use policies, Jefferson Parish has recently launched the
"Jefferson Parish: Opportunity Lives Here" public-relations campaign.336
This campaign consists of television and magazine advertisements,
social-networking sites, and other promotions. 337 The campaign is a
cooperative venture of the Jefferson Parish Government, the Jefferson Parish
Sheriffs Office, the Jefferson Parish Public School System, and the Jefferson
Parish Economic Development Commission. 338 These entities have agreed to
our population continues to grow. Mandeville is the most desired city to live within the
fastest growing parish in the State of Louisiana.
Mandeville, Louisiana Real Estate & Relocation Guide, RELOCATEAMERICA, http://www.

relocateamerica.com/louisiana/cities/mandeville (last visited Mar. 17, 2011).
333.

Relocate-America's 2009 Top 100 Places to Live, supra note 329. Earlier in the 1970s,

during a period of middle-class exodus and white flight from the City of New Orleans, Metairie
was described as "the finest and largest residential area in Jefferson Parish and it boast[ed] of
many beautiful and prosperous shopping centers." See THOEDE, supra note 220, at 120. Sheryll
Cashin describes these areas as "favored quarters." Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest,
and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO.

L.J. 1985, 1987 (2000) [hereinafter Cashin, Localism] ("In most American metropolitan regions
there are high-growth, developing suburbs that typically represent about a quarter of the entire
regional population but that also tend to capture the largest share of the region's public
infrastructure investments and job growth.").
334. Roberts, Land Shortage, supra note 209, at 7 ("Mike Sevante, St. Tammany Parish
council administrator, said the parish has no moratoriums specifically prohibiting multifamily
housing, although other types of construction are on hold due to traffic and drainage concerns.").
But see Cindy Chang, Updated Zoning Rules Passed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 26,

2007, at B-1 (explaining that, following a December 2006 moratorium on multifamily housing in
one historic district within Mandeville, the Mandeville City Council adopted restrictions on
multifamily-housing developments in certain parts of the district, though it permitted mixed-use
multifamily developments).
335. Notably, "[s]eventy-five percent of [the] housing market [in Mandeville] consists of
single family homes in nicely landscaped, upscale neighborhoods. The other 25% is a mixture of
condos, newly constructed apartments and three prestigious retirement communities."
Mandeville, Louisiana Real Estate & Relocation Guide, supra note 332. Moreover, "affluent,

job-rich suburban communities typically are devoid of affordable housing. And this exclusion of
low-income people, . . . whom other communities must house, is a critical component of their
fiscal and economic success." CASHIN, supra note 113, at 185.
336. See Jefferson Parish Quality of Life Coalition, Jefferson Parish: Opportunity Lives
Here - Ad Campaign (2010), http://www.opportunityliveshere.com/ad-campaign.html.
337. See id
338. Jefferson Parish Quality of Life Coalition, Jefferson Parish: Opportunity Lives
Here - Partners (2010), http://www.opportunityliveshere.com/partners.html.
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cooperate to address "quality of life" issues in the parish, including through
"strike forces" that will provide "strategic detailed solutions." 339
VI. WHAT CAN POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS TEACH Us ABOUT NECESSARY
FAIR-HOUSING REFORM?
A. Government-AssistedHousing Programs Cannot Follow the "PathofLeast
Resistance" and Comply with Fair-HousingLaw

The post-Katrina rebuilding experience with respect to rental housing has
revealed that the "path of least resistance" has been an abysmal failure. This
laissez-faire approach has helped illustrate the way in which private-market
forces and government interventions frequently conspire to create, maintain,
and reinforce entrenched racial residential segregation. 40

As Orleans Parish sought to deconcentrate poverty following Katrina, in part
through the demolition of thousands of units of public housing that would not
all be rebuilt, surrounding parishes took steps to counteract these
deconcentration
measures.
The first neighborhoods
in which
government-assisted housing was proposed outside of Orleans post-Katrina

were those historically considered to be the most affordable for individuals
341

In other words, communities such as
seeking to make upward moves.
Terrytown, Saint Bernard, and parts of Kenner and New Orleans East might be
considered the next rung on the housing ladder for those wishing to leave
high-poverty neighborhoods and locate in working- or middle-class
communities. Low-income and working-class white families exercised these
housing choices when many of these communities were established. 342 U.S.

Census data reflect that, at least in Kenner, New Orleans East, and Terrytown,
black families had already begun to make these moves in the 1980s and
1990s. 3 43 Despite its affordability, Saint Bernard remained overwhelmingly
white outside of the Village Square area, which could be attributable to
These
private-market discrimination and limited rental housing. 344
communities took decisive action to exclude new rental and government

339. Id
340. See supra Part V.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33 (explaining how the suburban areas outside
Orleans Parish provided better opportunities for low-income wage earners to live in
middle-income neighborhoods pre-Katrina); supra text accompanying notes 164-71 (discussing
the proportion of rental units slated to be replaced in areas surrounding Orleans Parish).
342. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 193-95 (discussing the reason many people
originally settled in Terrytown in Jefferson Parish).
343. See supra text accompanying 195-200 (describing the demographic movement in
Terrytown); supra text accompanying 222-23 (describing the demographic movement in
Kenner); supra text accompanying 310-16 (describing the demographic movement in New
Orleans East).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 296-304.
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housing after Katrina and sought to reverse any demographic shifts that
occurred prior to the storm. 345
On the other hand, several socioeconomically and racially homogeneous
communities, nationally recognized for their desirability, and arguably less
affordable or accessible to families seeking to escape concentrated poverty and
racial segregation-such as neighborhoods in Metairie and Mandeville-did
not make similar efforts. 346 This implies that housing subsidies were perhaps
not promoted in these communities, thus explaining the deafening silence with
respect to exclusionary-zoning activity.
Government-assisted housing programs will continue to perpetuate
segregation and poverty concentration if the "path of least resistance"
continues to govern location decisions. The "government must not only avoid
building in segregated neighborhoods but also must avoid building in
neighborhoods that are in the process of resegregation." 347 The irony is that,
aside from the initial intervention to provide the housing subsidy, the federal
government yields to a highly decentralized, laissez-faire scheme with regard
to where the subsidy will be utilized. 348 This is not to suggest that federal
housing programs are not heavily burdened by substantial reporting
requirements, myriad and conflicting regulations, and byzantine organizational
structures. 349 Rather, none of the bureaucracy has ensured that consumers who
use government subsidies have greater access to high-quality housing and
greater neighborhood choice than those who do not.3so
B. Government-Assisted Housing Must be Distributedand Managedon a
Regional Basis to Comply with the Anti-Segregation Mandates ofFair
Housing Law

Despite legal precedents recognizing the national policy of "balanced and
dispersed public housing,"351 and prohibitions against discrimination and
segregation in the nation's housing programs, neighborhoods in post-Katrina
New Orleans have strived to exercise veto power over assisted housing
whenever and wherever possible.352 The racial veto, although illegal, has
345. See supra Part V.B (discussing exclusionary efforts that area governments took).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 329-35.
347. Orfield, supra note 51, at 1797 (stating that fair-housing law "makes clear that siting
housing in racially concentrated or resegregating areas is generally prohibited").
348. See FREEMAN, supra note 100, at 3-4 (noting how states disburse federal housing
subsidies in ways that serve their own local housing goals).
349.

See, e.g.,

Bill Barrow, Bureaucracy Snags Housing Program, Auditor Says,

TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/capitallindex
.ssf?/base/news-6/1236662529238440.xml&coll=1 (noting that a housing plan financed with
federal dollars was delayed because it was "snarled in bureaucratic problems").
350. See supra Part IlI.D.
351. Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 390 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
352. See supra Part V.B.1-4. These neighborhoods are not likely dissimilar to other
neighborhoods throughout the nation. See Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation
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enduring force when a neighborhood perceives that its identity, quality of life,
and values are at stake.353 Elected officials will gamble with scarce resources
and risk costly enforcement actions to implement the racial veto. 354
At times, the veto finds expression in more neutral terms. 355 David Troutt
describes this phenomenon as "legal localism," which he contends is the
post-war successor to de jure segregation and consists of "substituting
economic proxies for race which could withstand constitutional challenge." 356
To be sure, race-neutral justifications are often pretexts for racial
discrimination, 357 and race-based intent claims have had some success in
challenging post-Katrina exclusionary-zoning practices.3s The Fair Housing
Act also allows individuals to bring disparate-impact claims to challenge
neutral rules that have the effect of disproportionately excluding blacks from
neighborhoods of opportunity. 359 In addition, when the proper record is
in Exclusionary Zoning Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623, 624 (1987) ("[State
liegislators . . . must reckon with voters who favor exclusionary zoning for its putative fiscal
advantages and environmental benefits, and who see it as a useful device for maintaining social
and racial homogeneity." (internal citations omitted)).
353. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
354. See McDougall, supra note 352, at 624-25 (describing the political pressures that drive
elected officials toward the racial veto); see also Alexander-Bloch, supranote 293 (describing the
running cost of the exclusionary-zoning litigation brought against Saint Bernard Parish as
including $1.5 million in attorney and settlement fees in addition to the parish's own attorney
fees).
355. See Troutt, supra note 67, at 1149 ("The power to exclude categories of uses associated
with urban problems . .. preclude[s] strict scrutiny, and allows the proliferation of racial proxies
under the guise of rational planning and community self-determination."). Troutt suggests
economic rationalism as an explanation for persistent racial segregation: "economic segregation
appears rational under a system that discriminates on the objective basis of land use categories,
wealth maximization considerations, and parental preferences about child welfare rather than
immutable characteristics like race." Id at 1161.
356. Id. at 1158 (discussing a series of 1970s decisions from which "a jurisprudential edifice
was erected that would define insiders from outsiders, draw economic meaning from
jurisdictional lines, empower suburbs against the cities from which they came, and limit their
responsibilities even to their regional neighbors").
357. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 248-66 (discussing Saint Bernard Parish's
controversial blood-relative ordinance); see also Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977) (discussing the circumstantial and direct evidence that bears on
whether a zoning decision was undertaken with a discriminatory purpose, including its disparate
impact on certain races, "[t]he historical background of the decision," "[t]he specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision," "[d]epartures from the normal procedural
sequence," "substantive departures," and "legislative or administrative history").
358. See supra notes 265-80, 287-95 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 928 (2d
Cir. 1988) (deciding whether a zoning ordinance that "restrict[ed] private multi-family housing
projects to a largely minority 'urban renewal area"' violated the Fair Housing Act), affd, 488
U.S. 15 (1988); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th
Cir. 1977) (finding that the defendant village had a statutory obligation under the Fair Housing
Act "to refrain from zoning polices that effectively foreclose the construction of any low-cost
housing" in a certain area). For a discussion of the ways in which litigants, courts, and
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presented, courts have imposed a more demanding vision of HUD's
affirmative duty and have required HUD to "consider regional approaches" to
360
At the state level, the
delivering housing opportunity to black households.
Supreme Court of New Jersey established "the Mount Laurel doctrine,"
interpreting the state constitution to require individual municipalities to
provide their fair share of low- and moderate-income housing in the region.361
Nevertheless, although litigation is vitally important as a tool for eliminating
illegal discrimination and segregation, alone it is an inefficient and
impracticable means of eliminating segregation throughout the nation's
362
housing programs.
Many commentators who have studied the phenomenon of "localism" 363 as
it is practiced throughout the country have embraced regionalism as the
tonic, 64 and it has been said that New Orleans could benefit from a
commentators blend the intent- and effects-based liability standards in civil rights cases with the
result of undermining the disparate-impact theory, see Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to
DisparateImpact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination
Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141 (2007).

360. See Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 463 (D. Md.
2005) ("It is high time that HUD live up to its statutory mandate to consider the effect of its
policies on the racial and socio-economic composition of the surrounding area and thus consider
regional approaches to promoting fair housing opportunities for [black] public housing
residents . . . .").
361. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 728-32 (N.J.
1975); see also Bernard K. Ham, Exclusionary Zoning and Racial Segregation: A
Reconsideration of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 577, 580 (1997)

("The Mount Laurel doctrine ... has come to signify the judiciary's efforts to desegregate New
Jersey's suburban communities, which have existed as enclaves for the wealthy white
population.").
362. See Ham, supra note 361, at 580-81 ("A recent empirical study concluded that the
Mount Laurel mandate has failed to achieve its goals" that include "producing more affordable
housing for the poor and . . . [the] implicit goal of ameliorating the racial residential segregation
in New Jersey."); McDougall, supra note 352, at 661. McDougall considers the Mount Laurel
litigation and explains that
[c]ourts are still ill-equipped to operate as "super zoning boards" for any length of time.
This does not mean that they must stand aloof. Judicial intervention in support of, or in
advance of, legislation making exclusionary zoning more difficult, more costly and
more susceptible to public inquiry is essential to progress in addressing this social
problem. Court disapproval of existing zoning arrangements, prescription of broad
outlines of future land-use policy, and the formulation of specific, developer-oriented
relief are legitimate, necessary catalysts to action by the legislature.
Id

363. See, e.g., Cashin, Localism, supra note 333, at 1990 ("A system that enables a privileged
minority to garner a majority of scarce public resources for development while exporting much of
the cost of its high-end development to other communities calls into question the normative
justifications for localism.").
364.

See MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 153

(2002) (arguing that "all regional communities benefit from regional reform"); DAVID RUSK,
INSIDE GAME OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA 147 (1999)

(noting that many communities use regional methods to "help dissolve concentrations of poverty"
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particularly stiff dose. 36 For example, the author has advocated a regional
approach in the distribution of affordable-housing resources in New Orleans
following Katrina, particularly in the wake of the massive demolition of public
housing conducted under the auspices of poverty deconcentration.36 Given
that the New Orleans area has, by necessity, entered a period of unprecedented
innovation and reform, the notion of putting aside old, more localist
approaches in favor of regionalist ones is not unthinkable.
Although regional governance is by no means the norm, there are a variety
of models.367 For example, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted a
law that establishes "a state-level housing appeals board with the authority to
overturn local decisions that reject affordable housing pro ects or impose
conditions on them that make them economically infeasible."
Other regions,
and "reduce fiscal disparities"); see also GERRIT KNAAP ET AL., ZONING AS A BARRIER TO
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 70 (2007) ("Although the evidence is limited, it appears

as though state and regional oversight can serve to reduce barriers to multifamily housing
development."); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Thinking Regionally About Affordable Housing and
NeighborhoodDevelopment, 28 STETSON L. REV. 577, 580 (1999) ("[A] regional approach offers

the best hope for success in recreating sustainable neighborhoods."); Troutt, supra note 67, at
1173 (advocating for "equitable regionalism" with interlocal cooperation mandated by state law
and including "a more even distribution of state resources across municipal populations, the
transformation of marginal areas into more integrated communities and the reduction of
significant disparities in the provision of public and private services among localities"). But see
Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93 (2009) (arguing against

supplanting local government with state or regional government and instead proposing a
redistricting approach to prevent inequities in the distribution of public goods resulting from
"Tiebout sorting," "because local boundaries would react to the development of enclaves of
wealth or poverty, existing residents would be substantially less able to choose, permanently, the
characteristics of their neighbors").
365. Troutt, supra note 67, at 1173 ("A region like the New Orleans metropolitan area is
better served by a top-down, compulsory state legislation requiring parishes within the region to
provide for [matters with regional implications], through their planning regulation with elected
regional commission authority over compliance.").
366. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 60, at 1266-68, 1274.
367.

See STUART MECK ET AL., REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 189-96

(2003) (detailing proposed elements for a model program of regional approaches to affordable
housing); McDougall, supra note 352, at 635-50 (discussing strengths and weaknesses of
legislative initiatives promoting affordable housing in California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
Oregon); Florence Wagman Roisman, Opening the Suburbs to RacialIntegration:Lessons for the

21st Century, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 65, 68-72 (2001) [hereinafter Roisman, Opening the
Suburbs] (discussing state and local laws designed to address economic exclusion in suburban
areas).
368.

KNAAP ET AL., supra note 364, at 25.

One commentator notes that, "[w]hile this

[Massachusetts] law . . . has had some success in getting otherwise intractable local governments
to approve affordable projects, it does not address the larger issue of increasing the supply of all
housing, in particular, multifamily housing, whether or not it is for low- and moderate-income
households." Id. Moreover, with regard to racial implications of the Massachusetts plan, one
scholar contends that "economic remedies cannot be used to solve racial problems" and that the
Massachusetts statute, to the extent that the beneficiaries are moderate-income whites, "is likely
to exacerbate racial segregation." Roisman, supra note 367, at 72, 84.
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like Minneapolis and Saint Paul, Minnesota, and Portland, Oregon, require that
local housing plans be subject to review by a regional-planning agency,
making it "more difficult for jurisdictions to use zoning to intentionally limit
multifamily development." 369 Others argue that zoning can be part of the
solution, typically through inclusionary zoning codes requiring that a
percentage of all new units developed be set aside as affordable. 370 In
California, state law mandates that local governments include a housing
element in their comprehensive plans, which address affordable housing and
explain "how the jurisdiction will meet its share of the regional housing
need." 37 1 Regional approaches should include counseling affordable-housing
consumers about the availability of housing in low-poverty neighborhoods or
in neighborhoods in which their race does not predominate. 72
As demonstrated by the proposals to site many of the post-Katrina
replacement rental units in already affordable, racially integrating suburbs,
which generated exclusionary-zoning responses, there may be common benefit
to a fair-share approach.3 73 As noted by Myron Orfield, suburbs are not
monolithic in the opportunities and services they are able to offer relative to

369. KNAAP ET AL., supra note 364, at 39, 45-46 (explaining that in Oregon, "[a]ll local
governments devise and enact zoning codes that must comply with both regional and state
requirements and plans. These requirements include density and housing mix targets that
encourage the development of multifamily housing").
370. See, e.g., id at 52 (noting that in Sacramento, stakeholders recognized zoning as a
barrier to achieving affordable housing, "but recognized that zoning is also an important part of
the solution"); see also METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, BROOKINGS INST., NEw ORLEANS AFTER
THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTuRE 32 (2005), available at

http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/2005/10metropolitanpolicyfixauthomame/20
051012 NewOrleans.pdf ("In preparation for the coming surge of housing construction, the
federal government should mandate that city-wide inclusionary zoning be adopted as a
prerequisite for the release of housing funds."). For a description of the first mandatory
inclusionary-zoning scheme in the United States, located in Montgomery County, Maryland, see
History of the Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU)

Program in Montgomery

County, Maryland, http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/dhctmpl.asp?url=/content/dhca/
housing/housing P/Summary and_History.asp (last edited Apr. 22, 2005).
371.

KNAAP ETAL., supra note 364, at 52.

372. For a discussion of housing-mobility counseling programs, including recommendations
to maximize the effectiveness of these programs, see Xavier de Souza Briggs & Margery Austin
Turner, Assisted Housing Mobility and the Success ofLow-Income Minority Families:Lessons for
Policy, Practice,andFutureResearch, 1 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 25, 38, 58-61 (2006).

373. Some commentators recommend that fair-share proposals should focus on zoning for
apartments rather than for government-sponsored affordable housing to avoid the stigma
associated with government housing. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, An Individual Preference
Approach to Suburban RacialDesegregation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 561-62 (1999). The

post-Katrina rebuilding experience suggests, however, that local governments and their
constituents tend to conflate the two and see zoning bans on apartments as the first line of defense
against government-assisted housing. See supra text accompanying notes 185-87, 209-19.
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the tax burdens they impose. 3 74 As regionalists point out, "[t]he leapfrogging
of consumer investment into 'favored quarters' leaves behind more and more
moderate- and middle-income suburban dwellers with increased taxes for
fewer services." 375 Older suburbs, such as Kenner and Terrytown, and inner
cities, such as New Orleans, can form strategic alliances to ensure that both the
rehabilitation and new construction of affordable housing does not become
concentrated in particular places. 3 7 6 These alliances dedicated to largely
regional approaches could render the region more competitive than sister
regions who cling to localism. 37 7
C. To Comply with FairHousing Anti-Segregation Mandates, HUD Must
Target Its Intervention in the Housing Market to Ensure that Federal
ProgramsCreateHousing Choices in Areas ofHigh Opportunity

Despite the appeal of regionalism, New Orleans illustrates that there is no
"silver bullet" to quelling resistance to siting government-assisted housing in
communities of opportunity.378 Simply requiring that suburban parishes accept
their fair share of affordable housing fails to address the potential for
concentrations of affordable units within those parishes, as the discussion of
Jefferson Parish's Terrytown and Saint Bernard Parish's Village Square
reveals. 379 Even when affordable units are created in otherwise-unaffordable
neighborhoods of opportunity, the units are often not inhabited by low-income
residents of urban areas such that residential segregation is ameliorated. 380
374.

ORFIELD, supra note 364, at 28-31; see also Turner, supra note 119, at 810 ("Although

many minorities have gained access to suburban residential communities, these are often not the
suburban jurisdictions that offer the most promising job opportunities.").
375. Troutt, supra note 67, at 1168.
376. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 364, at 164-65; cf CASHIN, supra note 113, at 309
(discussing how a coalition of mayors and various organizations in the Twin Cities of Minnesota
became strong supporters of a fair-share affordable-housing bill when they realized that their
communities already had more than their fair share of such housing).
377. See Troutt, supra note 67, at 1169 ("Metropolitan areas that continue to embrace
localism at the expense of shared regional responsibilities tend to be less competitive in attracting
economic development, keeping businesses and jobs, and maintaining a deep and talented labor
pool.").
378. See MECK ET AL., supra note 367, at 187 ("[T]here is no one best way to address the
provision of affordable housing in the United States on a regional or multijurisdictional basis.").
379. See supra text accompanying notes 193-219, 296-300; see also Roisman, Opening the
Suburbs, supra note 367, at 74 (discussing the concern that, even if suburbs accept low-income
housing, they will create enclaves for this housing, thus continuing the segregation and isolation
of low-income housing).
380. Florence Wagman Roisman, The Role of the State, the Necessity of Race-Conscious
Remedies, and Other Lessons from the Mount Laurel Study, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 1386, 1388

(1997) (discussing initiatives arising from New Jersey Supreme Court decisions requiring housing
to be built for a range of income groups in municipalities throughout the state [the Mount Laurel
litigation], and noting that "[o]f the Mount Laurel units amenable to study, '81 percent of all
suburban .. . units are occupied by white households, [while] 85 percent of all urban ... units are
occupied by black or Latino households," (second, third, and fourth alterations in original
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And, as some planning experts suggest, "local governments are fully capable
of developing new barriers if existing forms are curtailed or removed."
Quite rightly, scholars who have studied "the pervasiveness of the residential
segregated housing patterns" recommend a "multifaceted approach."382
Any multifaceted approach raises the question of what role the nation's lead
housing agency must play in opening housing markets to affordable housing.383
How can HUD ensure that its intervention in the housing market helps increase
opportunity, rather than build on historic, residential racial segregation?
Furthermore, how can HUD guarantee that the "path of least resistance" does
not continue to govern the siting of government-assisted housing, in which the
local racial veto all too easily finds expression in either explicit or coded

(quoting NAOMI BAILIN WISH & STEPHEN EISDORFER, CTR. FOR PUB. SERV., SETON HALL
UNIv., THE IMPACT OF 'THE MOUNT LAUREL INITIATIVES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE

CHARACTERISTICS OF APPLICANTS AND OCCUPANTS 70 (1996))); see also Roisman, Opening the

Suburbs, supra note 367, at 72 ("[I]nitiatives [directed at economic segregation] have not
ameliorated and indeed may have exacerbated racial inequality and segregation.").
381. KNAAP ET AL., supra note 364; see also McDougall, supra note 352, at 637 (discussing
the ability of a municipality in New Jersey to meet its fair-share requirements for affordable
housing by transferring up to 50% of its obligation to another municipality pursuant to a "regional
contribution agreement" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roisman, Opening the Suburbs,
supra note 367, at 77 (discussing the use of local preferences to ensure that affordable housing
built in suburbs "will go to whites"). To discourage this, one commentator recommends
"continuous monitoring of housing prices, rents, starts, household incomes, and housing
affordability measures" to inform policy and to prohibit new barriers to multifamily housing from
being erected. KNAAP ET AL., supra note 364.
382. Charles E. Daye, Whither "Fair" Housing: Meditations on Wrong Paradigms,
Ambivalent Answers, and a Legislative Proposal,3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 241, 266, 271 (2000);
see Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial

Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 926-30 (2006) (discussing case studies that "illustrate
the value of proactive, multifaceted efforts to promote stable integration"); see also Henry
Korman, Underwritingfor Fair Housing? Achieving Civil Rights Goals in Affordable Housing
Programs, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 292, 314 (2005) (discussing a

proposal to "make fair housing visible in the affordable housing real estate transaction by placing
an assessment of civil rights risk on the same plane as an evaluation of financial risk"). For a
description of a multifaceted approach at the state level, see McDougall, supra note 352, at 662
("Legislatures should amend their states' zoning enabling acts to prohibit exclusionary zoning,
establish regulatory and adjudicatory administrative agencies to oversee the municipalities'
compliance with the law, and allocate resources to facilitate the development of housing
affordable to low- and moderate-income persons.").
383. For a potential answer to this question, see Peter W. Salsich, Toward a Policy of
Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE

FOREST L. REV. 459, 465 (2007) (recommending "that Congress enact legislation to authorize
planning support for state and regional affordable housing initiatives and a federal override of
local zoning laws when necessary to enable affordable housing developments receiving federal
and state financial assistance to be scattered throughout residential neighborhoods"); see also
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra note 103, at 22 ("[E]fforts must continue to eliminate land
use policies that limit development of affordable, higher-density rental housing in resource-rich
suburban communities. Although regulatory reform is difficult to achieve, national housing
policy must confront political opposition head on.").
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terms? The legislative history of the Fair Housing Act suggests that HUD's
affirmative duty to further fair housing was viewed as a "way of buttressing
existing legal resources in order to mount a stronger attack on 'the widespread
problem of segregation in public housing."' 384 If this is so, then a more
vigorous enforcement mechanism must be enacted to fulfill this vision, such as
a private right of action to enforce HUD's affirmative duty, to ensure that
"HUD use[s] its grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and
segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing
increases."38 5
To fulfill its affirmative duty, HUD cannot continue to work in isolation.
The National Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity convened
hearings in five major U.S. cities in 2008 and issued a report with
recommendations for "creating and sustaining stable, diverse, inclusive
neighborhoods across America."3 86 The bipartisan Commission recommended
the revival of the President's Fair Housing Council-a creature of Executive
Order designed to coordinate fair-housing policy and practice across federal
agencies.
The Fair Housing Council "encourages a federal fair housing
review for major programs in all federal agencies, so that these programs are
consciously aligned to support, not undermine, fair housing goals."388 The
Commission also recommended that "the federal agencies participating in the
Council expressly require collaboration between their grantees at the
metropolitan and regional level[s] to support fair housing goals."389
HUD has begun to take some positive steps toward fulfilling its affirmative
mandate to further fair housing, which is an encouraging sign. 390 Yet, as the
nowhere-ist discussion above demonstrates, a municipality will refuse to
accept its fair share of affordable housing unless all of its other federal funding
384. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 21:1, at
21-5 (2007) (quoting Client's Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 1406, 1425 (8th Cir. 1983)).
385. NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 154-55 (1st Cir. 1987). A
private right of action could be created by amending the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (2006), to include within the definition of "discriminatory housing practice" the
affirmative duty to further fair housing. See id. § 3602(f) (defining "discriminatory housing
practice" for the purposes of the Act); id. § 3608(e)(5) (describing the Secretary of HUD's duties
to further the policies of fair housing laid out in the Act).

386.

NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44.

Former HUD Secretaries Henry

Cisneros and Jack Kemp chaired this bipartisan commission that included representatives of
industry groups, academia, and government. See id at i.
387. Id. at 51-52. At most, the Council met once and has essentially remained dormant since
its creation. Id. at 51.
388. Id. at 51.
389. Id. at 52.
390. HUD's 2011 program initiatives, such as the Transforming Rental Assistance Initiative,
Sustainable Communities Initiative, and Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, are all promising signs
that HUD may act more affirmatively to fulfill its fair-housing obligations in the future. See U.S.
DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HUD STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010-2015 23, 38-39 (2010)
(discussing HUD initiatives and programs).
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is conditioned on this acceptance.391 Since the storm, HUD has allocated over
$18 million in community development block grant funding alone to Jefferson
Parish, which includes Metairie, and over $3 million to Saint Tammany Parish,
which includes Mandeville.392 Rather than continuing to provide housing
funds that will be used at the local level to perpetuate segregation and poverty
concentration, in violation of fair-housing law, HUD, in partnership with other
range
of federal
can
condition the full
federal agencies,
community-development and infrastructure funding on compliance with the
fair-housing policies HUD has adopted on paper, but has failed to implement
in practice.

391. See supra text accompanying note 293 (discussing Saint Bernard Parish's refusal to
comply with federal court orders, but nevertheless showing its willingness to allow government
housing to proceed upon HUD's threat to withhold other federal funding). The National
Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity also recommends conditioning
community-development funding on "fair housing performance goals" set at the state and
regional levels, with housing programs "redirected to support a share of regional opportunity
goals." NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44.
392. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM FORMULA ALLOCATIONS FY 2006, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/budget/
budget06/index.cfm (follow the "Louisiana" hyperlink); U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FORMULA ALLOCATIONS FY 2007,
the "Louisiana"
(follow
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/budgetIbudget07/index.cfm
hyperlink); U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
FY 2008, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/about/
PROGRAM FORMULA ALLOCATIONS
budget/budget08/index.cfm (follow the "Louisiana" hyperlink); U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FORMULA ALLOCATIONS FY
2009, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpdlabout/budget/budget09/index.cfm (follow the "Louisiana"
hyperlink); U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM FORMULA ALLOCATIONS FY 2010, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpdlabout/budget/
budgetl0/index.cfm (follow the "Louisiana" hyperlink). Saint Bernard Parish does not receive an
individual allocation of CDBG funding, but reportedly has over $90 million in federal funds
currently committed to projects in the parish. See supra note 293.
393. Advocacy efforts to enforce HUD's affirmative duties relating to the
community development block grant program are beyond the scope of this Article, but generally,
receipt of these funds is conditioned on a community's certification that it will further fair
housing. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc., v. Westchester Cnty.,
668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting the obligation to affirmatively further fair
housing and finding violations of the False Claims Act in the county's failure to do so despite its
certification that it did). The certification requires the jurisdiction to "conduct an [analysis of
impediments], take appropriate actions in response, and to document its analysis and actions." Id.
at 569. The Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center has filed HUD complaints against
both Jefferson Parish and the State of Louisiana alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
based on what it describes as unsatisfactory certifications that the jurisdictions will further fair
housing in their housing- and community-development programs. Housing Discrimination
Complaint Against Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, at 2-3 (on file with author); Housing
Discrimination Complaint Against the State of Louisiana, at 2-3 (on file with author).

718

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 60:661

VII. CONCLUSION
Where should government-assisted housing be located? Rather than
"anywhere" or "nowhere," it should be located "everywhere."
If
government-assisted housing existed everywhere, then it would not need to be
concentrated in any particular place.
Ultimately, federal intervention in the housing market must encompass more
than providing a subsidy. It must open neighborhoods not already open, make
affordable what is not already affordable, enable housing subsidies to act as
gateways to educational and employment opportunity, and inform families
historically excluded from housing markets about their choices. 394 Most
importantly, HUD cannot reward exclusionary jurisdictions by continuing to
fund them.395 Any federal housing interventions that are not so designed will
almost certainly exacerbate existing racial segregation and poverty
concentration, as they have done for decades, and-as post-Katrina New
Orleans illustrates-as they will continue to do, again and again and again.

394. See Orfield, supra note 51, at 1798. Orfield explains that "stable, residentially
restrictive neighborhoods and cities should be targets of affordable housing activity." Id. He
argues that "[a]iming tax credits at the places to which people with the most residential choices
are attracted is a good strategy for integration, as it cuts off their avoidance." Id.
395. Daye, supra note 382, at 271 ("[T]he federal government should not provide funding to
a governmental body that acts to undermine . . . non-exclusionary housing, which is perhaps the
lynchpin of school desegregation, improved job opportunities, and an improved living
environment for minority and lower-income families.").

